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This dissertation examines the role of sell side equity analysts in the capital market. The first 
chapter examines whether sell side analysts, who as an important information intermediary, process 
information that has been shown to predict future stock returns by academic studies. Our sample includes 
seven firm level characteristics (e.g., anomalies) that have robust return predictability. We test whether 
analysts’ consensus recommendation and expected returns are consistent with the trading strategies these 
anomaly variables prescribe. We do not find evidence that sell side analysts are persistently incorporating 
such information in the correct way. Instead, analysts from certain brokerage firms persistently issue target 
prices in the opposite direction as what anomaly variables suggests. Our findings suggest that analysts are 
likely subject to biased expectations and could improve their research quality by incorporating anomaly 
characteristics. The second chapter investigates whether institutional investors value sell side analysts’ 
qualities differently. We fill the gap in the literature with a novel hand collected dataset, which shows the 
best sell side analysts voted by hedge funds and institutional investors, respectively. Examining the research 
output of investors’ revealed preferences allows us to detect the qualities valued by these investors. We find 
that hedge funds preferred analysts update research more frequently and issue less optimistic stock 
recommendations. The recommendations revised by these analysts also receive stronger market response 
in the subsequent six months than those made by other “All-Star” sell side analysts. These findings suggest 
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Sell side analysts are important information intermediary in the capital markets. The information 
they collect from firms and communicate with investors is important for market efficiency. Both 
practitioners and academics are interested in the role analysts play in the market. Earlier studies investigate 
whether analysts provide value adding information by examining analysts’ ability to forecast earnings and 
pick stocks (Womack (1996)). Due to the unobservable nature of analysts’ research process, there is a gap 
in the literature concerning what information is used by sell side analysts. Recently studies are able to 
examine the question by collecting information on analyst characteristics (e.g., sell side analysts’ school 
ties (Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2010)), analysts’ prior industry working experience (Bradley et al. 
(2017)). The first chapter of this dissertation examines the information used by analysts in their research 
process. Specifically, we look into a group of variables (e.g., anomalies) that are shown to robustly predict 
future stock return by academic research. Papers have shown that a long short trading strategy based on 
anomaly variables generates significant risk-adjusted returns. By examining whether analysts issue 
recommendations (or target prices) in the consistent way as those trading strategies suggests, we infer 
whether analysts are incorporating these return predicting variables in their research process 
The second chapter of this dissertation investigates whether institutional investors value sell side 
analysts’ qualities differently. Institutional investors are a prominent group of market participants due to 
their high ownership of equity in the stock market. The interaction between institutional investors and sell 
side analysts is not fully explored by prior literature potentially due to unavailable data. Using a hand 
collected dataset, we observe the revealed preferences of sell side analysts by a distinct group of institutional 
investors, hedge funds. Hedge funds are distinctly different from other long-only asset managers due to 
their investment strategies and instruments. By comparing the research outputs of the best sell side analysts 
voted by hedge funds and institutional investors, respectively, we infer the cross sectional differences 
































The first chapter is co-authored with Dr. Andy Puckett. 
Abstract 
 
We contribute to the debate surrounding sell-side analyst skill in a novel way. In particular, we 
investigate whether analysts’ incorporate salient firm-level information in their recommendations or target 
prices that has been shown by the academic literature to predict future abnormal performance (i.e., 
anomalies). In aggregate, there is little relation between analysts’ recommendation levels and anomaly 
prescriptions, however, analysts’ target price estimates are significantly higher for stocks in the “short” leg 
of an anomaly when compared to stocks in the “long” leg. In the cross section, we do not find evidence that 
certain brokerage firms or “All-star” analysts are anomaly savvy. However, evidence suggests that analyst’s 
experience tends to mitigate such bias. We conjecture that the value of analysts’ research would be 
significantly enhanced if analysts paid attention to academic research.  
1. Introduction 
 
Sell-side analysts are important intermediaries whom market participants rely on to gain 
information and insights about firms or industries. For investors, analysts’ ability to detect mispriced stocks 
and predict abnormal future returns is crucial. Thus, one should expect savvy analysts to incorporate 
information (particularly salient information) that predicts future abnormal performance into their research 
reports. For decades, academic literature has documented trading strategies based on firm-level 
characteristics that generate economically large abnormal returns. While academics often debate whether 
the documented abnormal performance reflects true mispricing or latent risk factor exposure (McLean and 
Pontiff, 2016), the fact that these firm characteristics are correlated with realized future return provides 
useful information for stock picking. While the majority of existing Finance literature focuses on finding 
new anomalies or whether anomaly returns are robust, a new and growing literature asks how certain market 
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participants react to existing anomalies 1 . This paper examines whether sell-side analysts incorporate 
academic research (specifically anomalies) into their research reports and whether certain analyst 
characteristics, e.g., all-star designation, analyst’s tenure and analysts who enjoy access to shared research 
resources at their brokerage firms are more likely to be academically sophisticated. 
Our research experiment adds to several areas of the existing academic literature. Of central 
importance is our contribution to the literature investigating sell-side analysts’ skill and whether analysts 
provide new (material and value relevant) information to equity market participants. While researchers have 
historically evaluated the value of analysts’ research by examining the abnormal returns around stock 
recommendations (e.g., Womack (1996)), such inference could be spurious when analysts’ research 
issuances are systematically correlated with corporate events (Bradley, et al. (2014); Altınkılıç, Hansen 
(2009)). Instead of using an event study to infer information in analysts’ research, we evaluate analysts’ 
skill by examining the relation between analysts’ stock recommendations (and price target estimates) and 
stock anomaly characteristics. Our evaluation occurs over longer horizons and allows us to test hypotheses 
related to skill in sell-side analyst research while being divorced from issues of confounding events (see 
Bradley, Clarke, Lee and Ornthanalai, 2014).  
We find that sell-side analysts’ consensus recommendations (and recommendation revisions) are 
positively associated with anomaly prescriptions. While the association is statistically significant, the 
magnitudes are questionable from an economic perspective. In contrast, analysts’ target price estimates are 
too high for stocks in the short leg of anomalies and too low for stocks in the long leg of anomalies. Overall, 
while analysts do not seem to systematically incorporate anomaly prescriptions in their recommendations 
or target prices, it is possible that some segments of the analyst population are academically sophisticated. 
We investigate whether analysts at particular brokerage firms, analysts with more experience or institutional 




1 Edelen, Ince and Kadlec (2016) show that institutional investors in aggregate trade contrary to anomaly prescriptions. 




investor all-star analysts incorporate anomaly information in their research reports. Interestingly, we find 
that some brokerage firms persistently issue target prices that are negatively correlated with anomaly 
prescriptions – we term these brokerages “academically unsophisticated.” A long-short trading strategy that 
buys stocks favored by academically unsophisticated brokerage firms and shorts stocks not favored by these 
brokerages generates negative abnormal returns of approximately 49 basis points per month. We also show 
that this perverse behavior is not mitigated in the subsample of all-star analysts. 
We begin our examination using a methodology employed in Edelen et al. (2016) to construct an 
aggregate measure for seven prominent anomalies found in the academic literature. The set of anomalies 
includes net operating assets (NOA), gross profitability (GP), investment-to-assets (IVA), Ohlson Score 
(O-score), book-to-market (BM), undervalued minus overvalued (UMO) and momentum. These variables 
have been found to predict significant future abnormal returns (Hirshleifer, et al. (2004), Lyandres, et al. 
(2007), Novy-Marx (2013), Dichev (1998), Fama and French (1992), Hirshleifer and Jiang (2010), 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)). For five of the seven anomalies (excluding momentum and UMO), we do 
the following: in June of each calendar year (t) we sort stocks into quintile portfolios based on anomaly 
characteristics obtained from accounting information at the end of year t-1. We assign each quintile a value 
between -2 and +2, where -2 (+2) is assigned to the quintile portfolio that anomaly prescriptions suggest 
investors should take a short (long) position. For undervalued minus overvalued (UMO), in June of each 
calendar year (t) we sort stocks into long, short and neutral portfolios based on firms’ financing during 
fiscal year t-1 and t-2. We assign value 2, 0, and -2 to the long, short and neutral portfolios respectively. 
For momentum, we amend this methodology slightly by updating quintile portfolio sorts each quarter 
(rather than in June of each year) based on stocks’ prior 12 month returns. We then calculate an aggregate 
“anomaly score” for each stock in each quarter by summing the portfolio assignments across all anomalies 
that we consider. We show that these ranks are informative for future abnormal returns as the value-




We then gather sell-side analysts’ recommendations and target prices from I/B/E/S for firms where 
we have anomaly data. We examine two measures related to analysts’ recommendations: the consensus 
recommendation and its changes over a long horizon (six quarters). The consensus recommendation is the 
average of the most recent recommendations by all analysts over the prior 12 months. We take the difference 
in the consensus recommendations over the prior six quarters as the change in recommendation. The long 
horizon covers the time period when stocks take on anomaly characteristics and gives analysts sufficient 
time to access relevant information.  
We also examine analysts’ implied/expected return from their target price estimates. Target prices 
have been found to include additional information beyond recommendations and earnings forecasts. Its 
continuous nature gives a more granular measure of analysts’ opinions of the stock returns. We scale the 
target price by the prior day stock price to get the implied (expected) return measure. The consensus implied 
return each quarter is the average of the most recent implied returns by all analysts over the prior 12 months.  
We examine the association between analysts’ recommendations (and implied returns) and stocks’ 
aggregate anomaly score after controlling for variables that have been found to be correlated with stock 
recommendations (and implied expected returns). We show that as the stock moves from the sell group 
(bottom quintile of anomaly score) to buy group (top quintile of anomaly score), its consensus 
recommendation increases by 0.04, which is economically small compared with a standard deviation of 
0.56. Alternatively, analysts’ implied returns are negatively associated with stocks’ anomaly characteristics. 
As stocks move from the sell (bottom quintile anomaly rank) to the buy (top quintile anomaly rank), the 
consensus implied return decreases by 5.2%, which is about 30.99% of the standard deviation. Such result 
suggests that analysts, in aggregate, consider the stock is overpriced when it’s in fact undervalued according 
to anomaly prescriptions. 
The above findings on analysts’ recommendations and target prices suggest analysts consider 
anomaly characteristics differently when they issue recommendations and target price estimates. Three 
potential reasons could explain the seemingly inconsistent findings. Firstly, recommendation values are 
discrete and bounded, its high skewness towards buy recommendations might not allow the tests to pick up 
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all the details. Second, recommendations and target prices could contain different information. For example, 
Brav and Lehavy (2003) find that analysts’ target prices provide additional information controlling for 
information in their recommendations and earnings forecasts. Huang, Mian, Sankaraguruswamy (2009) 
show that a trading strategy that combines analysts’ recommendations and target prices together 
outperforms a strategy that only adopts one analyst output. Third, analysts might strategically distort 
information communicated through different research outputs. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) show 
that affiliated analysts and a large group of unaffiliated analysts have incentives to “speak in two tongues”, 
issuing overoptimistic recommendations but more beatable earnings forecasts for covered firms.   
If the regression coefficients from the multivariate regression is true concerning analysts’ skill at 
processing anomaly variables to recommend stocks, we would expect that there are analysts in the cross 
section who persistently do so. As analysts’ skill and incentives are plausibly different in the cross section, 
ideally we would investigate the heterogeneity in processing anomalies at the analyst level. However, on 
average, an individual analyst covers a small number of stocks and issues about two recommendations and 
target prices each year for each covered stock. Because of these limitations in statistical power, we examine 
potential skill heterogeneity at the brokerage firm level. Research has suggested shared value-adding 
information among fund managers within the same fund management complex (Pomorski (2009)), between 
research and asset management departments in a full service brokerage firm (Irvine, Simko and Nathan 
(2004)) and among analysts who have access to in-house macroeconomists (Hugon, Kumar, and Lin 
(2015)) and Washington policy analysts (Bradley, Gokkaya, Liu and Michaely (2017)). We conjecture that 
some sell-side analysts would have access to shared information within the affiliated brokerage firm. If 
such shared information is related to anomaly characteristics and impacts analysts’ research outputs, we 
expect to pick up such characteristic through systematic variation at the brokerage firm level. 
We first identify whether the recommendation (or implied return) from a particular brokerage firm 
is consistent with anomaly prescriptions. We run cross-sectional regressions each quarter and include an 
interaction term between a brokerage firm fixed effect and the stock’s aggregate score rank. We interpret 
the coefficient on the interaction term as the level of a particular brokerage firm’s academic sophistication 
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– a positive coefficient suggests that as stock anomaly score increases, recommendation levels from the 
brokerage firm also increase. We then sort all the brokerage firms into quartiles based on the academic 
sophistication measure and track the characteristics of each quartile over the subsequent four quarters. We 
find that after two quarters following the formation date, the “sophistication” measure of each brokerage 
quartile loses statistical significance (i.e., they are not statistically different from zero) in the 
recommendation sample, suggesting brokerage firms do not possess persistent skill to process anomalies in 
their stock recommendations. In contrast, we find the bottom one quartile brokerage firms, who are 
identified as non-academically sophisticated, persistently issue target price that are against anomaly 
prescriptions over the subsequent four quarters. Meanwhile, the brokerage firms initially assigned as 
academically sophisticated do not show persistent skill to process anomaly characteristics correctly in the 
subsequent quarters. These findings are consistent with the view that analysts are not skilled at 
incorporating anomalies in their research. We show that a trading strategy which follows investment advice 
by non-sophisticated brokerage firms generate negative abnormal returns, suggesting that sell-side analysts 
could improve the value of their research by incorporating stock market anomalies in their research process. 
Our paper contributes to the knowledge of inputs in sell-side analysts’ research processes. An 
extensive analyst literature has investigated whether analysts’ research possesses valuable information. 
Literature has examined whether information from financial statements are incorporated into analysts’ 
research outputs. However, due to the unobservable nature of analysts’ analysis, it’s not completely clear 
what other inputs analysts use in their decision processes, a question referred as the “black box” by 
Bradshaw (2011). Several recent studies provide direct evidence and provide insights into the “black box”. 
Brown, Call, Clement and Sharp (2015) conduct surveys and interviews with analysts and show that private 
communication with management is more important than firms’ 10K filings when analysts forecast earnings 
and make recommendations. Bradley, Gokkaya, and Liu (2017) document that institutional investors value 
analysts’ industry experience and expertise greatly. This paper adds to the literature by investigating 
whether sell-side analysts, who are expected to provide sound investment advice to investors, use return-
predicting anomaly characteristics in their research. 
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This paper also adds to the literature on how market participants react to anomalies. McLean and 
Pontiff (2016) show that the post-publication profitability of anomaly variables is 58% lower than the 
magnitude documented during the academic study sample period, suggesting that investors learn from 
published anomalies. Studies have examined how different market participants’ react to anomalies. Wu and 
Zhang (2015) show that short sellers use anomaly-based strategies to short overpriced firms and avoid 
underpriced firms. Edelen, Ince and Kadlec (2016) show that institutional investors in aggregate trade 
contrary to anomaly prescriptions. Contemporaneous work by Engelberg, McLean and Pontiff (2018) 
examine 96 anomalies and find that analysts’ consensus recommendations and target prices tend to be in 
conflict with anomaly variables. Our paper differs in methodology and also in that we investigate whether 
anomaly processing skills are more evident in some segments of the analyst population. We do not 
investigate the risk and behavioral explanations for anomaly variables, however our findings are consistent 
with the explanation that analysts are likely subject to biased expectation that could contribute to stock 
mispricing.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section II discusses related literature and develops 
hypotheses. Section III describes data and variable construction. Section IV presents test design and 
empirical results. Section V concludes.   
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
Extensive literature has documented various variables that predict cross sectional future return. 
Despite the debate whether stock anomalies are mispricing or risk factors, the significant relation between 
anomaly variables and future stock returns provide incentive to use anomaly variables to predict future 
stock returns. Academic studies are interested in what information analysts use in their research process. 
Prior studies and survey suggest that sell side analysts incorporate both macro level and micro level 
information in their research output. Findings in Howe, Unlu and Yan (2009) show that aggregate analyst 
recommendations (i.e., recommendation aggregate across all analysts all stocks) have predictability in 
future market and industry returns. Da and Schaumburg (2011) show that analysts’ implied expected returns 
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derived from their target price estimates provide valuable information for stocks within industry. Since 
analysts’ research process is unobservable, studies have explored multiple information sources for sell-side 
analysts. For example, the early literature examine whether information in firms’ financial statements are 
captured in analysts’ earnings forecasts. Recent surveys indicate that communication with management are 
more valued by analysts than information in firms’ annual report and analysts’ industry expertise is highly 
valued by institutional investors. Besides information of industry outlook and firms’ fundamentals, anomaly 
variables can facilitate the stock picking process. 
Earlier accounting literature on analysts’ research and market anomalies have examined the relation 
between analysts’ earnings forecasts, cash flow forecasts and accounting anomalies such as post earnings 
announcement drift (PEAD) and accrual anomaly. These studies investigate questions such as whether 
analysts correctly recognize those anomaly characteristics and whether analysts’ research mitigates 
anomalous returns. Some find positive evidence that analysts’ research mitigate anomalous returns. For 
example, Zhang (2008) finds that market reacts more in the event window and less in the drift window with 
responsive analysts’ forecast revision, suggesting prompt analysts’ forecast revisions mitigates PEAD. 
Radhakrishnan, Wu (2014) show that accrual mispricing is less for firms having both earnings and cash 
flow forecast than for firms that only have earnings forecasts. Mohanram (2014) shows that the diminished 
returns to accrual-based strategies are related to more frequent and accurate analysts’ cash flow forecasts. 
Other studies suggest that analysts have biased expectation that are related to anomalous returns. Bradshaw, 
Richardson, Sloan (2001) show that analysts’ earnings forecasts do not incorporate the predictable future 
earnings declines associated with high accruals, which is negatively related to future stock returns. A later 
study by Bradshaw, Richardson, Sloan (2006) show a strong negative relation between firm’s net external 
financing and future stock returns (i.e., net external financing anomaly) while analysts’ forecasts are 
overoptimistic for firms with high net external financing. Amir, Kama and Levi (2015) show that both 
investors and analysts fail to recognize the contribution of different components of earnings to earnings 
persistence and it partially causes post-earnings announcement drift. Bouchaud et al. (2016) investigate 
quality anomalies (e.g., ratio of operating cash flows to assets) which indicates firms’ profitability. They 
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find that sell side analysts’ forecast errors are negatively correlated to quality indicators and suggest that 
analysts are less attentive to firm’s profitability indicators. Engelberg, McLean and Pontiff (2017) document 
that returns of 97 stock anomalies are 7 times higher on earnings announcement date and 2 times higher on 
corporate news day. They show that except anomalies based on valuation ratios, analysts’ earnings forecasts 
are too low for stocks in the long leg of anomaly portfolios and too high for stocks in the short leg of the 
anomalies. Although the significant anomalous returns gives stock pickers the motivation to take advantage 
of anomaly characteristics in the decision process, the above studies suggest that analysts might have 
limited attention or access to the full information set and exhibit biased expectation to some extent. We 
propose the first hypothesis as following:  
Hypothesis 1: Sell-side analysts’ consensus recommendation and target prices are not correlated 
to stock aggregate anomalies 
Analysts are not the same. Their research outputs are influenced by analysts’ skill, information set 
and incentives. For instance, Bradshaw, Brown and Huang (2013) find statistically significant but 
economically weak evidence of persistent differential ability across analysts to forecast target prices. 
Hugon, Kumar, and Lin (2015) find that analysts’ earnings research underreact to macroeconomic news, 
but analysts who have access to a macroeconomist employed by the same employer underreact much less. 
Lin, McNicols (1998) show that unaffiliated and affiliated analysts differ in the favoritism in 
recommendation and growth rate forecasts for firms went through underwriting. Ideally we would like to 
examine analyst level characteristics in terms of taking advantage of anomalies. However, due to the limited 
recommendations and target prices issued by an average analyst for an average covered firm each year, we 
propose a set of tests at the brokerage firm level.  
Findings in prior studies suggest that there is shared information and resources within an 
organization or social circle. For example, Irvine, Simko, and Nathan (2004) show affiliated analysts make 
more accurate earnings forecast for firms heavily owned by the asset management department in the same 
brokerage firm. Such positive externality could be due to the interaction between the asset management 
department and research department within a brokerage firms. For example, affiliated analysts might have 
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stronger incentive to better investigate firms to benefit the performance of the asset management 
department. The asset managers and analysts could also share information and ideas on these firms. 
Pomorski (2009) finds that shared trades (i.e., buy or sell the same stock) by multiple fund managers within 
the same fund management companies outperform benchmarks and other trades. Such shared trades are 
classified as “the best ideas” in Pomorski (2009) because they are generated by the shared information and 
research in the management company’s internal network. Pool, Stoffman and Yonker (2015) show that 
socially connected mutual fund managers who lives in the same neighborhood have similar holdings and 
trades, and a long short trading strategy based on trades shared by fund managers generate positive 
abnormal returns, suggesting value adding information through the network. We hypotheses that such 
shared resources or information also exist inside the research department within a brokerage firms. We 
believe this is a reasonable assumption because analysts within the same brokerage firms have the 
opportunity to work as a team and network as a group. Studies by Hugon, Kumar, Lin (2015) and Bradley, 
Gokkaya, Liu and Michaely (2017) show that access to in-house macroeconomists and policy analysts gives 
analysts an advantage to generate better quality research (e.g., less optimistic earnings forecasts and 
superior stock recommendations). If the shared information among analysts is related to anomaly strategies, 
recommendations and target prices issued by analysts within the same employer should be correlated to 
stocks’ anomaly variables. We expect to pick up such shared characteristic through brokerage firm fixed 
effects. The following is the second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2a: In the cross section, brokerage firms exhibit different ability to persistently 
incorporate anomaly characteristics in recommendation and target prices 
We next examine analyst characteristics that have been shown to be associated with better skill — 
analyst’s experience and “All-star” designation. Studies have shown that analysts with more experience are 
more accurate (Clement (1999), Mikhail, Walther, Willis (1997), Mikhail, Walther, Willis (2003)).  
Institutional Investor’s star analysts are found to provide more accurate earnings forecasts and more value 
adding stock recommendations by Stickel (1992) and Desai, Liang and Singh (2000)). However, whether 
12 
 
analysts with more experience or “All-star” title are academically sophisticated in their research is an 
empirical question and investigating this question furthers our understanding of this research question. 
Hypothesis 2b: In the cross section, analysts’ characteristic such as experience and “All-star” title 
are associated with ability to incorporate anomaly characteristics in recommendation and target prices 
For practitioners and investors, brokerage firms’ ability to persistently take advantage of anomalies 
matters if such ability increases the quality and value of analysts’ research. We show that a long short 
strategy which follows anomaly prescription generates both statistically and economically significant 
positive abnormal returns. Such abnormal return suggests incorporating anomalies could impact the 
investment value of analysts’ output. However, not being consistent with anomaly prescription doesn’t 
necessarily indicate that recommendations and target prices are of less investment value. To investigate 
whether anomalies could have real impact on the value of analysts’ research, we examine the profitability 
of following investment advice (through recommendation or target price) by both academically 
sophisticated and non-sophisticated brokerage firms. This leads to our third hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 3: The ability to incorporate anomaly characteristics in the analysis impact the 
profitability of recommendation and target prices positively.   
3. Data 
 
Data used in this paper comes from three sources. Firms’ financial data are obtained from 
Compustat, while stock prices, returns, and volumes are from CRSP. We obtain analysts' recommendations 
and target prices from the Institutional Broker Estimate System (I/B/E/S). Due to restrictions in the 
availability of data from IBES, all analyses using analysts' recommendations are restricted to sample dates 
from 1993 and 2016, whereas analyses involving target prices are from 1999 to 2016. Observations with 
unidentified analyst names are excluded from the analysis.  
3.1 Anomalies replication and aggregate score 
We replicate the methodology employed in Edelen et al. (2016) to construct an aggregate measure 
for seven prominent anomalies found in the academic literature. The set of anomalies includes net operating 
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assets (NOA), gross profitability (GP), investment-to-assets (IVA), Ohlson Score (O-score), book-to-
market (BM), undervalued minus overvalued (UMO) and momentum. The sample includes US common 
stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ, and excludes utilities, financials, and stocks whose 
prices are less than $5.  
We construct stock characteristics (i.e., net operating assets, etc.) for each separate anomaly 
following prior literature and detail these variables in Table 1.12. We then replicate the methodology used 
in Edelen, et al (2016).  For five of the seven anomalies (excluding momentum and undervalued-minus-
overvalued), we do the following: in June of each calendar year (t) we sort stocks into quintile portfolios 
based on anomaly characteristics obtained from accounting information at the end of year t-1.2 We assign 
each quintile a value between -2 and +2, where -2 (+2) is assigned to the quintile portfolio that anomaly 
prescriptions suggest investors should take a short (long) position. For undervalued-minus-overvalued, in 
each June in calendar year (t) we sort stocks into long, short and neutral portfolios based on firm’s financing 
in fiscal year t-2 and y-1. We assign value 2, -2 and 0 to the long, short and neutral portfolios respectively. 
For momentum, we amend this methodology slightly by updating quintile portfolio sorts each quarter 
(rather than in June of each year) based on stocks’ prior 12 month returns. We then follow each quintile 
portfolio over the subsequent 12 month period (ending in June of year t+1).3  Holding period returns are 
value weighted as in Edelen et al. (2016) and are presented in Table 1.10. We find that across the seven 
different portfolios, the “long” portfolio outperforms the “short” portfolio by between 1.06% and 2.42% 
per quarter when using Fama and French three-factor alphas.  
Since anomaly characteristics are not perfectly correlated, we conjecture that an investor might be 
better off by aggregating these anomaly characteristics into a single measure (consistent with McLean and 




2 Edelen, et al (2016) use tercile portfolios rather than quintile portfolios in their paper. We replicate their paper exactly 
and present anomaly portfolio returns in Table 1.11. Returns reported in Table 1.11 are quantitatively similar to those 
reported by Edelen. 
3 For momentum portfolios, we form new quintile portfolios each quarter and skip one month between the portfolio 
formation date and the measurement of portfolio returns. The holding period for momentum portfolios is 3 months. 
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Pontiff (2016) and Edelen, et al (2016)). We proceed by calculating an aggregate “anomaly score” for each 
stock in each quarter. Our aggregate score sums the quintile assignments – where a quintile assignment has 
a value from -2 (short) to +2 (long) – across all anomalies that we consider.4  As such, our aggregate 
anomaly score is bounded between -14 and +14. A more detailed description of this aggregation process 
(and the associated timeline) is presented in Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2. We present summary statistics for 
the aggregate score in Table 1.1. The average score has a mean (median) value of .9658 (1.0976). We also 
find significant amounts of variation. The value for the 25th percentile is -1.43 and the value for the 75th 
percentile is 3.59. In subsequent tests we partition sample firms into quintile portfolios based on the 
aggregate score (“aggregate score rank”). We show that these ranks are informative for future abnormal 
returns as the difference in performance between extreme quintiles is 2.49% per quarter (see Table 1.10) 
using Fama and French three-factor alphas. 
3.2 Analysts’ outputs 
3.2. 1. Recommendation 
Our research agenda is to ascertain whether sell-side analysts incorporate anomaly information 
when they provide information to clients. In particular, we believe that the analyst outputs most likely to 
be influenced are an analyst’s recommendations and target prices. We obtain analysts’ recommendations 
(buy, hold, sell) from the Institutional Brokerage Estimates System (IBES) during the period from 1992 
until 2016. Since our unit of analysis for anomalies is at the stock-quarter level, we match this for analysts’ 
recommendations by calculating an average recommendation score across all analysts that follow a 
particular stock in each quarter. Specifically, we include only the most recent recommendation from each 




4 For example, if a stock has a B/M ratio that is in the top (e.g. long) quintile and an O-score that is in the middle 
quintile in a particular quarter, then that stock’s aggregate score across these two anomalies would be +2 (this equals 
a +2 value for the B/M quintile and a 0 value for the O-score quintile). 
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analyst and require the recommendation be issued within the past 12 months (see Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, 
and Lee (2004), Howe, Unln, Yan (2009)).5 Specifically, we use the following equation: 
 





where 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑞 is the average recommendation, i and q denote the stock and quarter, and n is the number of 
distinct analysts.  Rec takes a value between 5 and 1, where 5 indicates a strong buy recommendation and 
1 indicates a strong sell recommendation. Table 1.1, Panel A shows that the average stock has a consensus 
recommendation of 3.74 (which is above hold and close to buy), consistent with findings in prior studies 
that analysts’ recommendation are optimistic (Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006)).  
3.2. 2. Target Price 
While our investigation of analysts’ recommendations has the benefit that it conveys an 
unambiguous endorsement, there are also some weaknesses. First, recommendations have been shown by 
prior research to be upwardly biased (Lin, McNichols (1998), Michaely, and Womack (1999)), as evidenced 
by the fact that only about 10% of total recommendations are in the categories sell or strong sell. Second, 
recommendations are categorical and might lack the necessary granularity to uncover the proposed relation. 
Fortunately, we also have access to analysts’ price targets. Price targets represent an analyst’s expectation 
of stock price movements over the subsequent 12 month period. As such, price targets can be used to 




) − 1 
(2) 
where i and j refer to the firm and analyst, and 𝑇𝑃𝑡,𝑗,𝑖 is the most recent target price issued by analyst j 
during the previous 12 months before the end of quarter q. 𝑃𝑡−1 is the stock price on the day prior to the 




5 During our sample period, the average analyst issues 1.33 recommendations (2.49 target prices) each year for the 
average firm that s/he covers.  
16 
 
Target Price announcement date (t). The prior day stock price is used as the denominator to avoid influence 
of analysts’ announcements on stock prices on the announcement day6. Both 𝑇𝑃𝑡,𝑗,𝑖  and 𝑃𝑡−1  are split 
adjusted using stock split factors from CRSP. We then take the average implied return for each stock and 
quarter across all analysts that have issued a target price in the previous 12 months. As reported in Table 
1.1, Panel B, the average stock has an implied return of 23.95%, which is similar to values reported by prior 
studies (Bradshaw, Brown and Huang (2013)). 
3.3 Sample descriptive statistics 
Table 1.1 shows the summary statistics for recommendation and target price samples separately. 
Summary statistics are from the sample after merging stock anomaly information, analysts’ 
recommendation (or implied return), and control variables. We calculate the distribution of each variable 
across all the firms each quarter and report the time series average, median, 25th percentile, 75th percentile, 
and standard deviation of each variable. Each quarter, there are on average about 1131 firms, 229 brokerage 
firms, and 2765 analysts each quarter in the full recommendation sample between 1994 and 2016. At the 
end of each quarter, each brokerage firm is associated with an average of 15.4 analysts, each of whom issue 
recommendations for an average of 7.4 firms in 2.6 industries. In the target price sample, there are on 
average 9.1 firms covered by 2807 analysts each quarter.  
The firms in the recommendation and target price samples are comparable in terms of 
characteristics such as firm size (market capitalization), stock trading volume and institutional ownership. 
For example, the average firm size is 6.98 billion in the recommendation sample and 7.36 billion in the 
target price sample.  
 




6 The empirical findings are robust for implied return measure where the denominator is the announcement month end 
stock price or quarter end stock price. 
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4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Univariate test 
Table 1.2 reports the univariate test7. Each quarter we sort stocks into quintile groups based on their 
aggregate anomaly score and report the average analyst recommendation for each quintile in Panel A. We 
find that the short anomaly portfolio receives an average recommendation of 3.768 (between a buy and 
hold), while the long anomaly portfolio receives an average recommendation of 3.759. We report the 
difference between the long and short legs is -0.008 (t-statistic=-0.45), suggesting that recommendation 
levels are not significantly different between the long and short legs.  
Since recommendation levels are potentially biased by conflicts of interest in the analyst-broker 
relationship (Michaely and Womack, 1999), one might expect that analysts (if they are paying attention to 
anomalies) revise their recommendations in an appropriate manner. To test this conjecture, we draw from 
the methodology of Edelen et al (2016) and calculate changes in analysts’ consensus recommendations 
from before anomaly variables are calculated (six quarters prior) to the current quarter – the methodology 
is illustrated in Figure 1.3.  The consensus recommendation of the short anomaly portfolio decreases by 
0.170 while the consensus recommendation of the long anomaly portfolio increases by 0.056. We report 
the difference between the long and short legs is 0.272 (t-statistics=9.82). Our results strongly suggest that 
analysts are revising their recommendations in the correct direction, but the adjustment is incomplete.   
We repeat our analyses in a restricted sample of observations where we require the same analyst to 
issue a recommendation for a particular stock in both periods (six quarters prior and the current quarter). 
Statistics in the restricted sample are consistent with findings in the full sample. The short anomaly portfolio 
receives an average recommendation of 3.647 while the long anomaly portfolio receives an average 
recommendation of 3.639. The difference between the long and short legs is -0.008 (t-statistic=-0.45). The 




7 The statistics are generated in the sample before merging control variables. 
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consensus recommendation of the short anomaly portfolio decreases by 0.154 while the consensus 
recommendation of the long anomaly portfolio increases by 0.045. The difference between the long and 
short legs is 0.199 (t-statistics=7.18). 
In Table 1.2, Panel B, we repeat our univariate statistics for implied returns derived from analysts’’ 
target prices. We find that the short anomaly portfolio receives an average implied return of 33.36%, while 
the long anomaly portfolio receives an average implied return of 23.78%. The difference between the long 
and short legs is -9.58% (t-statistic=-6.32), suggesting that implied returns are statistically higher for the 
short leg of the anomaly portfolio. We again test the restricted sample and find consistent inference. The 
difference between the long anomaly portfolio (average implied return is 30.32%) and the short anomaly 
portfolio (average implied return in 20.52%) is -9.80% (t-statistic=-6.71). Overall, our univariate findings 
present clear evidence that analysts’ target price estimates are in the opposite direction of what anomaly 
prescription would suggest. 
One might expect analysts to have consistent views for a particular stock in all of their external 
communications with firm clients. As such, it is curious that analysts’ recommendations do not seem to be 
associated with anomaly prescriptions, while target price forecasts are opposite. One possibility for this 
apparent contradiction is that the above univariate tests are conducted at consensus level in two separate 
samples and the composition of analysts included in the consensus measures are not the same. In order to 
flesh out our result, we investigate the relation between target prices and anomaly variables after 
conditioning on the recommendation level (i.e., holding recommendation levels constant).  
We include only analysts who issue both a recommendation and target price for the same firm in 
the same quarter (outputs issued over the prior 12 months). We then parse all observations by 
recommendation level (e.g., strong buy) and within each recommendation level group we sort stocks each 
quarter into quintile portfolios based on their aggregate anomaly score rank. Table 1.3 reports the average 
implied return for each aggregate score quintile portfolio conditional on each recommendation level 
between 1999 and 2016. In the strong buy recommendation group, the short leg portfolio has a median 
(mean) implied return of 36.93% (42.05%) while the long leg portfolio has a median (mean) implied return 
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of 28.76% (30.35%). The same negative relation between aggregate anomaly quintile rank and average 
implied returns also shows up in both buy and hold recommendation groups. Although we find a less clear 
pattern between aggregate anomaly scores and average implied return in the sell (or strong sell) groups, we 
are cautious in our interpretation of these patterns since both sell and strong sell categories contain a very 
small number of recommendations (approximately 90% of our observations are in the strong buy, buy, and 
hold categories).  
The above findings suggest that analysts’ recommendations are not associated with anomaly 
prescriptions while their target price estimates are negatively correlated with what anomalies would 
prescribe. However, such inference might be incorrect due to potential omitted variables. Therefore, we 
next investigate the relationship between stock recommendation (and implied returns) and anomaly 
characteristics while controlling for variables that have been found to be correlated with analysts’ 
recommendation or implied return by prior studies. 
4.2 Multivariate tests 
Prior studies have documented variables that could explain stock recommendations. For example, 
Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004) show that firms with positive earnings surprises and high sales 
growth are associated with favorable stock recommendations. Bradshaw (2004) shows that long term 
growth rate has the greatest explanatory power to recommendations and favorable recommendations are 
likely to be justified by price-earnings ratio. Jackson (2005) documents that stock recommendations are 
impacted by the conflict faced by sell-side analysts, the conflict between building their reputation and 
issuing optimistic research to generate short term trading commissions. Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei, 
and Yan (2007) find that analysts’ recommendation relative to consensus is negatively associated with the 
presence of institutional investors. We follow findings from these studies and control for variables that are 
correlated to stock recommendations, including firms’ sales growth, earnings-to-price ratio, standardized 
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unexpected earnings (SUE), firm size, total accrual, stock trading volume and institutional ownership8. 
Table 1.4 reports the multivariate regression where the dependent variable is analysts’ consensus 
recommendation of a particular stock (𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡) or its change over the past six quarters (∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡). We choose 
Tobit regression because stocks’ consensus recommendations are not discrete and are bounded between 1 
and 5. Specifically, we run the following regression (3), where i and t refer to firm and quarter: 
𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 (𝑜𝑟 ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 +




+ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠  
(3) 
We find that aggregate score rank is positively associated with the consensus recommendation 
level. However, the economic magnitude of the association is not significant. Specifically, as aggregate 
score rank increases by one standard deviation, the consensus recommendation level increases by 0.014, 
which is small compared with its standard deviation 0.556. Prior studies (Edelen, Ince and Kadlec (2016)) 
on stock market anomalies show that the performance of long and short legs of anomaly differ. Their 
findings suggest that the short leg of anomaly contributes more to risk adjusted abnormal return potentially 
due to short sell constraint, we next investigate whether analysts process anomaly characteristics differently 
for stocks in the long and short legs of the anomaly. We group stocks into long (short) leg if their aggregate 
score ranks are in the top (bottom) two quintiles. We then run regression (3) in each of the two sub samples 
respectively. The results show that the positive association between anomaly score rank and stocks’ 
consensus recommendation is statistically significant for stocks in the long leg. In contrast, anomaly 
characteristics are not associated with analysts’ consensus recommendation for stocks in the short leg. 
Consistent with findings in the univariate test, we find that aggregate score rank is positively associated 




8 Table 1.4 does not include analysts’ long term growth rate and analysts’ revision in earnings forecast as in Jegedeesh, 
Kim, Krische and Lee (2004). These two variables as analysts’ research output are likely correlated to control variables 
in the right hand side of the regression. The regression results are robust if we add them as controls. 
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with changes in stock’s consensus recommendation (∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡) over prior six quarters. Column (4) to (6) in 
panel A of table 1.4 reports the multivariate regression where the dependent variables is the change in 
consensus recommendations. We find a positive association between changes in consensus 
recommendation and aggregate score rank. The association is statistically significant in both long and short 
subsamples. Specifically, the consensus recommendation of an average stock in the strong buy group at 
quarter t increased by 0.071×2=0.142 (t-statistic=6.33) over the past six quarters while the consensus 
recommendation of an average stock in the strong sell group at quarter t decreased by 0.057×2=0.114 (t-
statistic=5.97) over the past six quarters9.  
The above tests are conducted in the full sample, including both revisions and first-time issued 
recommendations. In other words, analysts who issued recommendations by the end of quarter t could be 
different from those who issued recommendation for the same stock six quarters ago, hence the change in 
consensus recommendation over the six quarters could include unobservable analyst characteristics that we 
cannot control for. To eliminate the influence by analysts’ characteristics, we conduct the same multivariate 
regression in the restricted sample. The restricted sample requires the analyst to issue recommendations 
over the 12 months prior to quarter t-6 and quarter t, hence the change in consensus recommendation 
removes the impact of time-invariant analysts’ characteristics on stocks’ recommendation. The restricted 
sample also removes the impacts from initiation and drop of analyst coverage. For example, Irvine (2003)) 
suggest that initiation and stop of analysts’ coverage have more information than revisions of existing 
recommendations. McNichols and O’Brien (1997) show that analysts tend to stop coverage instead of issue 




9 In unreported tests, we regress consensus stock recommendation (or its change over prior six quarters) on each 
anomaly separately. Analysts’ consensus recommendations are negatively associated with four of the seven anomalies 
and are not associated with two of the seven anomalies. The changes of consensus recommendations are positively 
associated with five out of the seven anomalies examined in this paper. We next include post publication dummy for 
each anomaly and the interaction between anomaly score and post publication dummy in the regression. We do not 
find evidence that analysts become academically sophisticated after anomalies are made public. 
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sell recommendations for firms they view unfavorably. We report the restricted sample results in panel B 
of table 1.4.  
Findings in the restricted sample are consistent with those in the full sample. As aggregate score 
rank increases by one standard deviation, the consensus recommendation level increases by 0.011 
(=1.3537*0.008), which is small compared with its standard deviation 0.683. In the subsamples, the positive 
association between consensus recommendation level and aggregate score rank is marginally significant in 
the long leg and not significant in the short leg. The association between aggregate score rank and change 
in consensus recommendation level over prior six quarters are statistically significant in both long and short 
subsample. Specifically, the consensus recommendation of stocks in the strong buy group increased by 
0.049×2=0.098 (t-statistic=3.23) over the past six quarters while the consensus recommendation of stocks 
in the strong sell group decreased by 0.047×2=0.094 (t-statistic=2.86) over the past six quarters. The smaller 
economic magnitude in the restrictive sample suggests that analysts’ initiation (drop) of coverage and 
aggregate score rank is positively (negatively) associated.  
Besides examining analysts’ stock recommendations, we also investigate another important 
research output by sell-side analysts, target price estimates, which has been found to possess information 
beyond earnings forecast and stock recommendation by prior studies (Brav and Lehavy (2003)). In addition 
to the additional information, target prices’ continuous nature allows tests to pick up information that could 
be missing in discrete stock recommendations. To control for variables that are correlated to analysts’ 
implied returns (derived from target prices), we follow Dechow and You (2013) who examine determinants 
of errors in implied returns (derived from target price estimates). They find three sources of explanatory 
variables: analysts’ fundamental forecasts, stocks’ risk characteristics and analysts’ incentives. Based on 
their findings, we include the following control variables in the multivariate regression for analysts’ 
consensus implied returns. Analysts’ fundamental forecasts include realized earnings forecast errors, long 
term growth rate revisions and dividend yield. Stock risk profiles include Amihud illiquidity, size, and 
idiosyncratic volatility. Variables proxy for analysts’ incentives are stock trading volume, institutional 
ownership and firm’s external financing. We also include 52-week high dummy to account for analysts’ 
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anchoring effect (Li, Lin, Lin (2016)). We run the following OLS regression model (equation (4)) and 
cluster standard errors at firm and quarter level, where 𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡  is the consensus implied return for stock i at 
quarter t. 
𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽352 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑 𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽9𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽11𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡  
(4) 
Table 1.5 reports the results for regression (4). In both full and restricted samples, an average 
stock’s consensus implied return is negatively associated with its aggregate score rank. The negative 
association is statistically significant across model specifications in different samples. As a stock moves 
from strong sell (bottom aggregate score rank) to strong buy (top aggregate score rank), the consensus 
implied return decreases by 0.013×4=5.2%, suggesting that analysts in aggregate consider an undervalued 
stock (i.e., a strong buy by anomaly prescription) as overpriced. If anomaly prescription generates 
significant abnormal return, trades based on target price estimates that are contrary to anomaly prescription 
could hurt investor’s value. Indeed, we show that a value weighted long short strategy that follows anomaly 
prescription, namely longs stocks in the strong buy and shorts stocks in the strong sell generates a quarterly 
Fama French alpha of 2.49%, or a 10.34% annually alpha10 (data is Table 1.10). These findings suggest that 
sell-side analysts in aggregate are wrong about the direction of future return with non-trivial economic 
magnitudes11. 




10 A similar long short strategy based on aggregate score rank of stocks that have analyst coverage  generates 
statistically significant annual Fama French three factor alpha of 9.92% in recommendation sample and 6.81% in 
target price sample. 
11 In unreported tests, we regress consensus implied returns on each anomaly separately. Analysts’ consensus implied 
returns are negatively associated with six of the seven anomalies in this paper. We next include post publication 
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4.3 Brokerage level tests 
So far, we treat sell-side analysts as an entity and examine their recommendation and target price 
in the aggregate level. However, analysts are heterogeneous in the cross section. Both academic research 
and financial press have documented differences in performance and value generated by analysts. For 
example, some analysts (star analysts) are valued by buy side institutional investors more than non-star 
analysts. Sorescu and Subrahmanyam (2006) document different market reactions to high and low quality 
analysts. Ideally we would like to examine the cross sectional heterogeneity in terms of processing anomaly 
characteristics among analysts. However, due to the small number of recommendations and target prices 
issued by individual analysts each year, it’s not feasible to conduct tests with sufficient statistical power to 
draw the inference. Instead, we conjecture that there is shared information among sell-side analysts who 
are affiliated to the same brokerage firm. Prior studies (Irvine, Simko, Nathan (2004), Pomorski (2009), 
Pool, Stoffman and Yonker (2015)) show evidence that suggests shared (value-adding) information among 
people within business environment and social settings. Studies also show that access to in-house 
macroeconomists (Hugon et al. (2015)) and in-house Washington Policy analysts (Bradley et al. (2017)) 
gives sell-side analysts an edge to provide better quality research, suggesting shared information in 
brokerage firm’s internal network. 
4.3.1 Persistence or academic sophistication at brokerage firm level12 
To examine brokerage firms’ academic sophistication, we first identify whether research outputs 
from a brokerage firm are conform or contrary to anomaly prescription by running the following Tobit 
model (regression (5)) each quarter. 




dummy for each anomaly and the interaction between anomaly score and post publication dummy in the regression. 
We do not find evidence that analysts correctly incorporate anomalies after publication. 




𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑞 = 𝛽1𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑞 + 𝛽2𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑛
+ 𝛽3𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑛 × 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑞
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑞 + 𝜀 
(5) 
where 𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑞 is the most recent recommendation issued by analyst j for stock i over the 12 months prior 
to the end of quarter q, 𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑛 is a series of dummy variables for brokers in the 
sample. The dummy variable for the brokerage firm n13 is one if analyst j who issued the recommendation 
is affiliated with broker n when the recommendation was issued.𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑛 ×
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑞 is the interaction between the dummy variable of brokerage firm n and the 
stock’s aggregate score rank in quarter q. The interaction coefficient 𝛽3  is a measure of academic 
sophistication. A positive value of the interaction coefficient 𝛽3 means that the recommendation issued by 
brokerage n is positively associated with stock i’s aggregate score rank, suggesting brokerage firm n 
correctly process anomaly characteristics in the stock recommendation. A close to zero 𝛽3 suggests the 
recommendation from the brokerage firm is not related to anomalies, suggesting brokerage firm n does not 
pay attention to anomalies. A negative 𝛽3  suggests the brokerage firm is acting against anomaly 
prescription. We collect the coefficients 𝛽3 for each brokerage firm each quarter over the sample period 
and examine the persistence of academic sophistication (𝛽3) in the following steps.  
The idea is to sort brokerage firms into groups based on their academic sophistication measure (𝛽3) 
and then track the characteristics of each group. By doing this, we answer the question how the average 
“sophistication” measure of each group change over the subsequent quarters. Specifically, at quarter q, we 
sort all the brokerage firms into quartiles based on their interaction coefficients 𝛽3. Brokerage firms in the 
bottom quartile are labeled as non-academically sophisticated and those in the top quartile are labeled as 




13 To be included in the sample, each brokerage firm need to issue recommendations (target prices) to more than ten 
(five) firms in a quarter. We suppress the constant term so that there is no base level in the brokerage firm fixed effects. 
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academically sophisticated. We then compute the average interaction coefficients (𝛽3)  across all the 
brokerage firms in each quartile from quarter q (the formation quarter) to quarter q+414. Table 1.6 reports 
the time series mean of the “sophistication” measure for each quartile brokers from the formation quarter q 
to the subsequent four quarters. Specifically, the bottom quartile (Q1) brokerage firms have an average 
interaction coefficient 𝛽3  of -0.2707 (t-statistic=-10.04) in the formation quarter, suggesting 
recommendations from these brokerage firms are in the opposite direction as anomalies prescribe. The top 
quartile (Q4) brokerage firms have an average interaction coefficient 𝛽3 of 0.2970 (t-statistic=12.09) in the 
formation quarter q, suggesting recommendations from these brokerage firms are consistent with anomaly 
score ranks. However, the “sophistication” measures are not statistically different from zero after two 
quarters subsequent to the formation quarter. The difference in the “sophistication” measure between non-
academically sophisticated brokers (bottom quartile brokers) and academically sophisticated brokers (top 
quartile brokers) is not statistically different from zero by quarter q+415, suggesting no persistent skill of 
processing anomaly variables in the cross section of brokers. We also keep track of the retention ratio of 
each broker quartile over time. One quarter after the formation period, the retention ratios of each quartile 
range around 40% to 50%.  By the end of quarter Q+4, only about 30% of the brokerage firms stay in the 
quartile that they are originally assigned in the formation quarter.  
We next follow the same method and examine persistent skill in the target price sample. We run 
the following OLS regression (equation (6)) each quarter, where 𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑞 is the implied return by analyst 
j for stock i in quarter q. 𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑞 is computed as in equation (1). 




14 We record the average number of brokerage firms in each quartile over time. A brokerage firm temporarily leaves 
the sample in quarters when it had no recommendation in the prior 12 months (the reason that the number of brokerage 
firms in each quartile differ in subsequent quarters). 
15 We note that Q+4 is the quarter we should focus on for detecting persistence because the dependent variable in the 
regression include the most recent recommendations by each analyst over the past 12 months.  
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𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑞 = 𝛽1𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑞 + 𝛽2𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑛
+ 𝛽3𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑛 × 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑞
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑞 + 𝜀 
(6) 
Table 1.7 reports the persistent test results in the target price sample. We find that a group of 
brokerage firm persistently generate target prices that are in the opposite direction as anomaly prescribes. 
In the formation quarter, the top quartile brokerage firms (academically sophisticated brokers) have an 
average 𝛽3 of 0.0523 (t-statistic=7.92), suggesting implied returns derived from target prices issued by 
these brokerage firms are consistent with aggregate anomaly prescription. The bottom quartile of brokerage 
firms (non-academically sophisticated brokers) have an average 𝛽3 of -0.0788 (t-statistic=-9.88), 
suggesting these brokerage firms act against anomalies in their target price estimates. Different from results 
in the recommendation sample, in the target price sample brokerage firms in the bottom quartiles keep 
providing target prices that are against anomaly prescriptions over the subsequent four quarters. The 
difference in 𝛽3  between academically sophisticated (top quartile) and non-academically sophisticated 
(bottom quartile) brokers are positive and significant throughout the following four quarters after the 
formation quarter. We show that it’s the bottom quartile brokers that drive such difference. These findings 
are consistent with those in the previous univariate and multivariate tests, where the aggregate score rank 
and consensus implied returns are negatively correlated. In the cross section of brokerage firms, instead of 
finding brokerage firms that are academically sophisticated, we find a group of brokers persistently act 
against anomalies. 
4.3.2 Profitability of recommendations or target price issued by brokerage firms 
Although brokerage firms may issue recommendations or target prices that are not consistent with 
anomaly prescriptions, it does not necessarily mean that these recommendations or target prices have no 
investment value. It’s an empirical question whether being anomaly savvy is associated with high quality 
of stock recommendation and target prices estimates. We next examine the profitability of the 
recommendation (and target prices) issued by brokerage firms with different academic sophistication.  
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We follow the method in Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2001) and create buy/sell 
portfolios indicated by (non-) academically sophisticated brokers. As we did previously, at the end of 
quarter t, we sort all the brokerage firms into quartiles based on each brokerage firm’s “sophistication” 
measure 𝛽3 from regression (5). We then go to quarter t+1, for each stock we compute the average of 
recommendations issued by academically sophisticated brokerage firms (i.e., the top quartile brokerage 
firms). Specifically, we include the outstanding recommendations issued in quarter t+1 by academically 
sophisticated brokers to compute the average recommendation. Next we sort all the stocks into terciles 
based on the average recommendation. The bottom tercile stocks are labeled as sell and the top tercile stocks 
are labeled as buy. We then compute the monthly stock returns in quarter t+2 for the buy and sell group 
stocks16. We next repeat the above steps and compute the monthly stock return for the buy and sell 
recommendations by non-academically sophisticated brokerage firms (i.e., the bottom quartile of brokerage 
firms sorted in quarter q). Panel A of Table 1.8 reports the Fama French monthly alphas of each portfolio.  
We find that a long short strategy based on recommendations from non-sophisticated brokers 
generate negative Fama French monthly alpha of -33 basis points (t-statistic=-2.19). Specifically, the sell 
portfolio based on recommendations issued by non-academically sophisticated brokerage firms generates a 
monthly Fama French alpha of 16 basis points (t-statistic=1.55) in the subsequent quarter while the buy 
portfolio based on recommendations by these brokerage firms generate a monthly Fama French alpha of -
18 basis points (t-statistic=-1.67). In contrast, we find that a similar long-short strategy based on 
recommendations issued by academically sophisticated brokerage firm do not generate alphas that are 
significantly different from zero. 
We next examine the profitability of trades following the implied returns (derived from the target 
prices) by academically sophisticated and non-academically sophisticated brokers. The method is the same 




16 We value weight the monthly stock return using the stock’s market capitalization at the end of quarter t+1. 
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as in the recommendation sample except that we use regression model (6). We report the results in panel B 
of table 1.8. We find that “sophisticated” and “non-sophisticated” brokerage firms do not differ with 
statistical significance. Specifically, the buy group stocks (i.e., those in the top implied returns tercile) 
suggested by non-academically sophisticated brokerage firms (i.e., brokerage firm who act against anomaly 
prescriptions) has a -54 basis points (t-statistic=-2.50) monthly Fama French alpha while the sell group 
stocks suggested by the same group of brokers has a -5 basis point (t-statistic=-0.49) monthly alpha. The 
trading strategy which longs the buy group stocks and shorts the sell group stocks generates a negative 49 
basis points monthly alpha, which is not significantly different from returns generated by the same strategy 
based on suggestions from “sophisticated” brokerage firm. These findings are consistent with results from 
previous multivariate regression and persistence tests where no evidence suggests that brokerage firms 
could incorporate anomaly characteristics to improve the value of their research output. 
4.4. Other cross sectional analysts’ characteristics 
Besides examining the cross sectional heterogeneity among brokerage firms, in this section we 
examine two characteristics of sell-side analysts, the “Institutional Investor All-Star” designation and 
analysts’ experience. The II all-star analysts ranking has attracted a lot of attention from practitioners and 
academic research. It tells important information about sell side analysts’ quality valued by buy-side 
institutional investors. All-star analysts are perceived by large buy side institutional investors as the most 
value adding among their peers. Prior studies have also shown that star analysts provide more accurate 
earnings forecast (Stickel (1992)) and outperforming stock recommendations (Desai, Liang and Singh 
(2000)). Studies have also documented that analysts’ tenure is positively associated with high quality 
research (Clement (1999), Mikhail et al. (1997)). Therefore, we next run tests and examine whether these 
two analyst characteristics are associated with being anomaly savvy.  
We hand collected the name and affiliation of All-star analysts between 2004 and 2016 from the 
October issue of Institutional Investor magazine. We manually match star analysts to I/B/E/S detailed 
recommendation and target price databases by their name, affiliated organization and the year they receive 
the award.  
30 
 
We create dummy variable Star, which is 1 for top three analysts in the annual Institutional Investor 
analyst ranking and 0 for the rest analysts. We also include analyst’s special or general experience and its 
interaction with aggregate score rank in the regression. Analyst’ special experience is the number of years 
an analyst covers a given stock. Analysts’ general experience is the number of years an analyst have been 
in the I/B/E/S database. We include this analyst level characteristic to control for potential learning-by-
doing (Mikhail, Walther and Willis (1997), (2003)). The interaction between special experience and stock’s 
aggregate score rank measures whether analysts gradually pick up anomaly characteristics as s/he gain more 
experience with the stock. Each quarter, we run Tobit regression 
𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑗 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑗
+ 𝛽4𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡
× 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒17𝑖,𝑡 
(7) 
where 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the most recent recommendation issued by analyst j for stock i during the previous 12 
months before quarter t, 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 is stock i’s aggregate anomaly rank at the end of quarter 
t, and 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑗 is the dummy variable which is 1 if analyst j is among the top three II-All America research 
teams in the year to which quarter t belongs. Panel A in table 1.9 reports the Fama MacBeth regression 
results. The t statistics are generated by Newey-West adjusted standard errors with 4 lags. We find that star 
analysts are negatively associated with stock recommendation level. Specially, recommendations made by 
star analysts are 0.11 lower than recommendations made by non-star analysts on average, suggesting that 
star analysts are less optimistic and offer more conservative recommendations. The signs of the interaction 
term Star × aggregate score rank suggest that star analysts tend to issue recommendations that are in the 
opposite direction as anomaly prescribes. Specifically, as a stock’s aggregate score rank increases by one 
star analyst on average reduces the recommendation by 0.016. Coefficients on special experience and its 




17 The control variables are the same as in regression (3). 
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interaction with aggregate score rank suggest that more experience is associated with less optimistic 
recommendation and more academic sophistication18. 
In the target price sample, we repeat the Fama Macbeth regression as in the recommendation 
sample, each quarter we run the following OLS regression, 
𝐼𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑗 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑗
+ 𝛽4𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡
× 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
(8) 
where 𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the implied return derived from the most recent target price issued by analyst j for stock i 
in the 12 months prior to quarter t. We report the time series means19 of the coefficients from cross sectional 
regressions in panel B of table 1.9. Consistent with results in multivariate regression from Table 1.5, which 
shows that consensus implied return is negatively associated with stock’s anomaly prescription, we find 
that aggregate score ranks are negatively associated with individual analyst’s implied expected return, We 
also find that All-star analyst title is negatively associated with implied expected return, suggesting star 
analysts are less optimistic in their target price estimates. However, the coefficient on the interaction 
between star analyst and anomaly score rank is not statistically significant. Therefore, we do not find 
evidence that star analysts are academically sophisticated in terms of processing anomalies in their research. 
However, the coefficient on the interaction between aggregate score rank and analyst’s general experience 
is marginally significant, suggesting more academic sophistication is associated with analysts’ tenure in 
forecasting future stock price. 
 




18 In a different model, we regress the consensus recommendation level on the average experience of analysts covering 
the stock and controls. The results show that the consensus recommendation level is positively associated with 
analysts’ special experience. 





In this paper, we investigate the question whether sell-side analysts process anomaly characteristics 
in their recommendation and target price estimates. We first conduct tests at the aggregate level where we 
examine analysts’ consensus stock recommendation and consensus implied returns. Evidence suggests that 
analysts correctly incorporate anomaly characteristics recommendation revisions, however the revisions are 
not sufficient. In contrast, at the aggregate level analysts issue target prices that are in the opposite direction 
as anomalies characteristics suggest. In other word, analysts in aggregate are optimistic (pessimistic) about 
stocks that are overvalued (undervalued) according to aggregate anomaly prescription. We next examine 
several segments of the analyst population and investigate whether there are cross sectional heterogeneity 
among analysts in terms of academic sophistication. Specifically, we find little evidence that brokerage 
firms possess persistent skill in terms of incorporating anomaly characteristics in recommendations or target 
prices. In addition, we show that a group of brokerage firms persistently issue target prices that are against 
stocks’ anomaly prescription. A trading strategy that buys stocks favored by non-academically sophisticated 
brokerage firms (i.e., those issue recommendations or target prices that are in the opposite direction as 
anomalies suggest) and sell stocks not favored by these brokerage firms generate statistically significant 
negative monthly Fama French alphas. Lastly, we look into analysts’ level characteristics such as the 
Institutional investor All-star title and analysts’ experience. We find that star analysts either do not pay 
attention to anomaly characteristics (in the target price sample) or act against anomaly prescription (in the 
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Table 1.1 Summary Statistics 
The following summary statistics are time series averages of each cross sectional mean, median, 25th percentile, 75th percentile, standard deviations and number of 
observations in each quarter. Restricted sample requires the analyst cover the same stock in the prior 12 months before quarter t-6 and before quarter t. We examine 
seven anomalies, including BM (book-to-market ratio), MOM (momentum), GP (gross profitability), IVA (investment-to-asset), NOA (net operating assets), UMO 
(undervalued minus overvalued) and OSC (Ohlson score). Each quarter, we sort stocks into quintiles based on their anomaly characteristics. Each individual 
anomaly rank has five values, namely -2, -1, 0, 1, and 2. Quintile 2 represents strong buy and quintile -2 represents strong sell. For each stock, Aggregate Score is 
the summation of individual anomaly ranks and has a value between -14 to 14 by construction. Agg. Score rank is the quintile rank based on stocks’ aggregate 
score. EP is earnings-to-price ratio. SUE is standardized unexpected earnings. Market cap is stock market capitalization in millions of dollars. Volume is the rank 
percentile (between 0 and 1) based on stock’s daily trading volume in its listed stock exchange. Sales growth (SG) is past four quarter revenues over prior four 
quarter revenues. TA is total accrual scaled by total assets. 52weekhigh dummy equals one if the average stock return in quarter t is above the 95 percentile of the 
highest stock price in the past 52 week. LTGREV is the revision in consensus long term growth rate. FY1_BIAS (realized earnings forecast errors) is the difference 
between analysts’ consensus one-year ahead EPS forecasts and the corresponding actual EPS, scaled by stock prices when the consensus target prices are computed. 
Inst. own is institutional ownership and firms with greater than 100% institutional ownership are excluded from the sample. External financing is the amount of 
external financing scaled by the average total assets. Idio. Volatility is measured by standard deviation of the residual in Fama French 3 factor regression using 
three month daily return data. Illiquidity is Amihud liquidity ratio over the 12 months preceding the current month. REC is the quarterly consensus recommendation 
level, which is the average of the most recent recommendations by each analyst over the prior 12 months. ∆REC is the change in consensus recommendation level 
from quarter q-6 to quarter q. No. analysts broker is the number of analysts from one brokerage firm who have at least one recommendation over the past 12 
months. No. industry broker is the number of industries covered by a brokerage firm in the past 12 months. No. firm broker is the number of firms covered by a 
brokerage firm over the past 12 months. No. firm is the number of firms covered by an analyst over the last 12 months. No. industry is the average number of 
industries covered by an analyst in the past 12 months. IRET is the average of target price/stock price one day prior – 1. Only the most recent recommendation 
(target price) by an analyst over the past 12 months (one quarter) are included to compute REC, ∆REC and IRET. Utilities, financials and stocks with price less 
















Table 1.1 Continued 
Variable N Mean P25 P50 P75 St. dev  N Mean P25 P50 P75 St. dev 
 Panel A Recommendation Full sample  Panel B Recommendation restricted sample 
Aggregate score 1131.1 0.9658 -1.4329 1.0976 3.5854 3.6543  692.7 1.1613 -1.0395 1.3421 3.6184 3.5146 
Aggregate score 
rank 1131.1 -0.1071 -1.0976 -0.0122 1.0000 1.3762 
 
692.7 -0.0449 -1.0921 -0.0132 1.0000 1.3537 
BM rank 1131.1 -0.5709 -1.8720 -0.9878 0.2073 1.2291  692.7 -0.5775 -1.7632 -0.9671 0.1711 1.2219 
Mom rank 1131.1 -0.0755 -1.0488 0.0000 1.0000 1.3774  692.7 -0.0854 -1.0461 -0.0132 1.0000 1.3474 
GP rank 1131.0 0.5421 0.0000 0.7805 1.1220 1.0823  692.7 0.5041 -0.0461 0.4342 1.0395 1.0694 
IVA rank 959.5 -0.0869 -1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.3436  578.3 -0.0178 -1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.3292 
NOA rank 1114.6 -0.4129 -1.3232 -0.4573 0.6463 1.2477  685.4 -0.3726 -1.1316 -0.1974 0.6053 1.2075 
OSC rank 1131.1 0.7343 0.0000 1.0000 2.0000 1.1481  692.7 0.7797 0.0000 1.0000 2.0000 1.1130 
UMO rank 1054.6 0.8798 0.0000 1.4634 2.0000 1.3306  637.7 1.0077 0.0000 1.7105 2.0000 1.2883 
Sales Growth (%) 1131.1 1.1726 1.0167 1.1057 1.2476 0.2987  692.7 1.1287 1.0047 1.0852 1.2030 0.2349 
TA 1131.1 0.0077 -0.0455 -0.0029 0.0491 0.1185  692.7 -0.0010 -0.0467 -0.0067 0.0383 0.0999 
EP ratio 1131.1 0.0270 0.0148 0.0425 0.0649 0.0860  692.7 0.0269 0.0168 0.0431 0.0644 0.0907 
SUE 1131.1 0.1190 -0.5929 0.0832 0.7750 1.2068  692.7 0.1231 -0.5759 0.0922 0.7858 1.1828 
volume 1131.1 0.6292 0.4539 0.6637 0.8330 0.2447  692.7 0.6521 0.4851 0.6915 0.8493 0.2365 
Market cap  1131.1 6978.5 472.1 1319.5 4088.5 23842.6  692.7 10356.9 786.7 2231.4 6846.3 30347.2 
Inst. ownership 1131.1 0.6747 0.5652 0.7100 0.8159 0.1881  692.7 0.7151 0.6248 0.7449 0.8364 0.1665 
REC 1131.1 3.7374 3.3671 3.7490 4.1049 0.5561  692.7 3.6433 3.1233 3.6623 4.0876 0.6834 
∆REC 1131.1 -0.0797 -0.5205 -0.0780 0.3532 0.7122  692.7 -0.0591 -0.6410 -0.0665 0.5051 0.9085 
No. analyst broker 229.3 15.4 2.4 6.1 15.7 26.2  188.3 12.3 1.8 5.3 13.5 18.8 
No. industry broker 229.3 13.3 2.9 9.3 20.3 12.4  188.3 10.5 2.3 6.6 15.5 10.5 
No. firm broker 229.3 93.6 9.7 29.9 97.4 160.0  188.3 48.2 5.5 17.5 51.8 79.9 
No. firm 2765.3 7.4 3.2 6.2 10.1 6.6  1886.7 4.4 2.0 3.4 5.9 3.8 







Table 1.1 Continued 
variable N Mean P25 P50 P75 St. dev  N Mean P25 P50 P75 St. dev 
 Panel C Target price full sample  Panel D Target price restricted sample 
Aggregate score 972.1 0.8687 -1.4242 0.9621 3.4091 3.6180  882.1 1.0109 -1.2417 1.1167 3.5333 3.5105 
Aggregate score 
rank 972.1 -0.1538 -1.1667 -0.0833 1.0000 1.3697 
 
882.1 -0.1174 -1.1000 -0.0500 1.0167 1.3563 
BM rank 972.1 -0.6825 -1.9545 -1.0152 0.0606 1.2037  882.1 -0.6577 -1.9500 -1.0000 0.0667 1.2032 
Mom rank 972.1 -0.0435 -1.0606 0.0000 1.0303 1.3825  882.1 -0.0688 -1.0500 0.0000 1.0000 1.3574 
GP rank 972.1 0.5418 -0.1061 0.7424 1.0455 1.0750  882.1 0.5596 0.0167 0.7333 1.0833 1.0565 
IVA rank 820.5 -0.0875 -1.0000 0.0152 1.0152 1.3560  742.1 -0.0585 -1.0000 0.0000 1.0167 1.3499 
NOA rank 953.7 -0.4388 -1.6591 -0.7803 0.4242 1.2490  867.5 -0.4371 -1.4333 -0.7583 0.3333 1.2346 
OSC rank 972.1 0.7318 0.0000 1.0152 2.0000 1.1534  882.1 0.7504 0.0000 1.0167 2.0000 1.1357 
UMO rank 902.1 0.8941 -0.0303 1.6667 2.0000 1.3449  813.7 0.9874 0.0000 1.9333 2.0000 1.3061 
Dividend yield 970.2 0.0078 0.0000 0.0002 0.0113 0.0140  880.7 0.0081 0.0000 0.0002 0.0121 0.0141 
Idio. volatility 972.1 0.0233 0.0157 0.0213 0.0287 0.0102  882.1 0.0213 0.0145 0.0195 0.0260 0.0092 
illiquidity 972.1 0.0155 0.0005 0.0021 0.0080 0.0549  882.1 0.0095 0.0004 0.0014 0.0054 0.0302 
Volume 972.1 0.6599 0.4988 0.7009 0.8540 0.2342  882.1 0.6585 0.4986 0.7004 0.8519 0.2345 
Market Cap  972.1 7356.5 638.2 1619.5 5011.3 19136.5  882.1 7960.0 722.7 1813.3 5345.5 20521.6 
52weekhigh 
dummy 972.1 0.2732 0.0000 0.1061 0.5455 0.4039 
 
882.1 0.2771 0.0000 0.1167 0.5500 0.4015 
Inst. ownership 894.8 0.7180 0.6220 0.7544 0.8501 0.1773  803.2 0.7420 0.6545 0.7776 0.8637 0.1660 
External Financing 971.9 0.0159 -0.0603 -0.0045 0.0485 0.1534  881.9 0.0002 -0.0655 -0.0128 0.0334 0.1364 
FY1_bias 969.6 0.0040 -0.0033 0.0001 0.0056 0.0229  879.9 0.0034 -0.0033 -0.0001 0.0051 0.0213 
LTGREV (%) 972.1 1.1001 -0.9885 0.2743 3.0578 6.6714  882.1 1.0068 -1.0136 0.3001 2.9113 6.4655 
IRET 972.1 0.2395 0.1366 0.2059 0.3070 0.1678  882.0 0.2163 0.1145 0.1858 0.2823 0.1843 
No. analyst broker 232.1 17.1 2.2 6.4 17.3 29.3  186.2 12.7 1.7 5.1 13.7 19.9 
No. industry broker 232.1 12.0 2.2 6.8 18.6 12.5  186.2 10.7 2.0 5.8 15.9 11.5 
No. firm broker 232.1 110.3 7.1 26.0 100.5 210.4  186.2 78.0 5.6 19.0 71.3 146.7 
No. firm 2807.1 9.1 3.6 7.9 13.0 7.0  1863.8 7.5 3.1 6.4 10.7 5.7 
No. industry 2807.1 2.5 1.0 2.0 3.3 1.9  1863.8 2.2 1.0 1.8 2.8 1.6 
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Table 1.2 Univariate Tests 
This table reports the time series average of portfolio characteristics for each aggregate score rank. Full sample 
includes all the available observations while the restricted sample requires the same analyst to cover the same stock 
over the 12 months prior to quarter q-6 and quarter q. Top quintile portfolio (long leg) has a value of 2 of Aggregate 
score rank (Agg. Score Rank). No. stock is the average number of stocks in each quintile portfolio over time. REC is 
the average of consensus recommendations across stocks in each quintile each quarter. ∆REC is the average of change 
in consensus recommendations over prior six quarters across stocks in each quintile portfolio. Score is the average of 
aggregate anomaly scores across stocks in each quintile portfolio. IRET is the average consensus implied return of 
each aggregate score quintile. Long – Short is the difference in the variable (i.e., REC, ∆REC or IRET) between the 
top quintile (Agg. Score Rank=2) and bottom quintile (Agg. Score Rank =-2). Time series t statistics (Newey West 
adjusted with four lags) are in the parentheses.  
 
Panel A Recommendation Sample 
 Full  Restricted 
Agg. Score 
Rank 
No. stock score REC ∆REC  No. stock score REC ∆REC 
(short) -2 367.6 -4.3564 3.7678 -0.1704  189.6 -4.2038 3.6470 -0.1537 
-1 353.5 -0.7209 3.7347 -0.1153  199.9 -0.6953 3.6259 -0.1042 
0 369.3 1.4521 3.7232 -0.0788  224.0 1.4479 3.6224 -0.0631 
1 331.3 3.4306 3.7341 -0.0242  202.9 3.4253 3.6313 -0.0153 
(Long) 2 308.2 6.1646 3.7594 0.0561  179.3 6.1307 3.6389 0.0452 
          
Long - Short   -0.0084 0.2723    -0.0081 0.1989 
   (-0.45) (9.82)    (-0.45) (7.18) 
Panel B Target Price Sample 
  Full   Restricted 
Agg. Score Rank  No. stock score iret   No. stock score iret 
(short) -2  399.7 -4.3008 0.3336   311.8 -4.1563 0.3032 
-1  352.9 -0.6452 0.2648   291.5 -0.6161 0.2345 
0  374.3 1.4785 0.2437   332.7 1.4785 0.2141 
1  341.4 3.4352 0.2329   292.0 3.4296 0.2038 
(Long) 2  307.4 6.1596 0.2378   253.3 6.1333 0.2052 
          
Long - Short    -0.0958     -0.098 












Table 1.3 Conditional Univariate Test 
Table 1.3 reports univariate test conditional on analyst-stock level recommendation between 1999 and 2016. Each 
quarter, we collect the most recent recommendation and target price by an analyst for a stock over the prior 12 months. 
Conditional on the recommendation received, we show the average implied return (IRET) of stocks in each aggregate 
score rank. No. stock is the time series average of number of stocks in each aggregate score rank each quarter. No. 
quarters is the number of quarters with available data between 1999 and 2016. Mean, median and std. dev are the time 
series mean, median and standard deviation of quarterly implied return of each aggregate score rank conditional on 
the value of stock recommendation.  
 
Analysis Variable : average IRET 
Recommendation Aggregate Score rank No. Quarters Mean Median Std. Dev No. Stock 
5 (strong buy) (short leg) -2 71 0.4205 0.3693 0.1243 403.7 
 -1 71 0.3492 0.3141 0.0927 325.7 
 0 71 0.3200 0.2970 0.0690 340.8 
 1 71 0.3075 0.2909 0.0657 301.1 
 (long leg)  2 71 0.3035 0.2876 0.0604 263.5 
       
4 (short leg) -2 71 0.3844 0.3397 0.1211 529.4 
 -1 71 0.3100 0.2825 0.0789 443.7 
 0 71 0.2848 0.2701 0.0683 451.6 
 1 71 0.2674 0.2618 0.0429 391.4 
 (long leg) 2 71 0.2675 0.2569 0.0433 324.4 
       
3 (short leg) -2 71 0.1827 0.1188 0.1252 571.2 
 -1 71 0.1355 0.1019 0.0775 511.4 
 0 71 0.1228 0.0962 0.0675 550.6 
 1 71 0.1187 0.0914 0.0692 470.5 
 (long leg) 2 71 0.1170 0.0932 0.0615 386.5 
       
2 (short leg) -2 71 -0.0116 -0.0812 0.1724 70.0 
 -1 71 -0.0248 -0.0722 0.1701 63.3 
 0 71 -0.0676 -0.0799 0.0798 68.7 
 1 70 -0.0252 -0.0825 0.1410 57.4 
 (long leg) 2 70 0.0185 -0.0957 0.4415 48.1 
       
1 (strong sell) (short leg) -2 68 -0.1650 -0.2051 0.1560 25.1 
 -1 69 -0.1600 -0.1829 0.1333 19.2 
 0 68 -0.1484 -0.1555 0.1064 23.5 
 1 69 -0.1504 -0.1648 0.1118 18.3 







Table 1.4 Impact of Aggregate Score Rank on Consensus Recommendation and Its 
Revision 
This table presents the Tobit regression model where the dependent variable, consensus stock recommendation (REC) 
or change in consensus recommendations from quarter t-6 to quarter t (∆REC) is regressed on stock’s aggregate score 
rank and control variables. Quarter dummies are included in each regression and standard errors are clustered at firm 
and quarter level. Dependent variables in column (1) to (3) are consensus stock recommendations (REC). Dependent 
variables in column (4) to (6) are change in consensus recommendation over quarter q-6 and quarter q (∆REC). 
Column (1) and (4) include all stocks in the sample. Column (2) and (5) include stocks in the top two aggregate score 
ranks. Column (3) and (6) include stocks in the bottom two aggregate score ranks. Aggregate score rank is each stock’s 
aggregate score rank each quarter. SUE is standardized unexpected earnings. SG is revenue in the past four quarters 
over the revenues in the 4 prior quarters. TA is total accrual over total assets. Volume is the percentile based on average 
daily stock trading volume over shares outstanding over past 6 months in the stock exchange where the stock is listed. 
Size is natural log of stock market capitalization (in thousands dollars). SUE is standardized unexpected earnings. EP 
is earnings-to-price. Inst. own is institutional ownership. 
 
Panel A recommendation (Full sample) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
  REC REC REC   ∆REC ∆REC ∆REC 
  Full Long Short   Full Long Short 
             
Aggregate score rank 0.010*** 0.033*** -0.012  0.061*** 0.071*** 0.057*** 
 (3.33) (3.55) (-1.60)  (16.26) (6.33) (5.97) 
SG 0.279*** 0.380*** 0.235***  0.098*** 0.136*** 0.090*** 
 (16.53) (14.13) (14.64)  (8.74) (4.84) (7.23) 
TA 0.316*** 0.309*** 0.286***  0.176*** 0.160*** 0.199*** 
 (13.00) (7.47) (9.13)  (5.73) (3.19) (4.91) 
SUE 0.058*** 0.044*** 0.066***  0.060*** 0.045*** 0.065*** 
 (20.32) (11.97) (16.98)  (16.23) (9.26) (14.69) 
Volume -0.020 0.008 -0.071***  -0.093*** -0.023 -0.160*** 
 (-0.90) (0.27) (-2.84)  (-5.25) (-0.85) (-6.69) 
Inst. ownership 0.215*** 0.157*** 0.240***  0.184*** 0.078** 0.204*** 
 (7.70) (3.81) (8.00)  (6.86) (2.27) (5.93) 
size -0.012*** -0.017*** -0.001  0.026*** 0.004** 0.050*** 
 (-4.49) (-4.77) (-0.48)  (7.41) (2.16) (22.22) 
EP 0.263*** 0.193*** 0.285***  -0.083 -0.185** -0.056 
 (6.77) (2.81) (6.24)  (-1.42) (-2.13) (-0.79) 
Quarter dummies Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
No. observation 85325 29796 36783  85325 29796 36783 










Table 1.4 Continued 
Panel B Recommendation (Restricted Sample) 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
  REC REC REC   ∆REC ∆REC ∆REC 
  Full Long Short   Full Long Short 
             
Aggregate Score rank 0.008** 0.024* -0.005  0.046*** 0.049*** 0.047*** 
 (2.01) (1.80) (-0.39)  (10.16) (3.23) (2.86) 
SG 0.325*** 0.396*** 0.287***  0.114*** 0.123** 0.124*** 
 (13.55) (9.95) (9.99)  (4.11) (2.27) (3.66) 
TA 0.264*** 0.305*** 0.233***  0.169*** 0.188** 0.193** 
 (5.73) (4.50) (3.70)  (2.87) (2.13) (2.48) 
SUE 0.049*** 0.036*** 0.054***  0.055*** 0.039*** 0.059*** 
 (12.69) (6.63) (9.55)  (10.84) (5.53) (8.07) 
Volume -0.025 -0.048 -0.054  -0.090*** -0.066 -0.114*** 
 (-0.85) (-1.19) (-1.47)  (-3.54) (-1.64) (-2.83) 
Inst. ownership 0.273*** 0.284*** 0.295***  0.140*** 0.159*** 0.119** 
 (6.84) (4.56) (6.05)  (3.75) (3.12) (2.25) 
size 0.014*** 0.009** 0.026***  0.016*** 0.003 0.033*** 
 (4.32) (2.02) (6.37)  (3.86) (1.34) (10.95) 
EP 0.181*** 0.008 0.244***  -0.066 -0.263** 0.026 
 (3.98) (0.10) (4.30)  (-1.11) (-2.33) (0.33) 
        
Quarters dummies Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
No. observations 51171 18865 20536  51171 18865 20536 




















Table 1.5 Impact of Aggregate Score Rank on Consensus Implied Return  
This table presents the OLS regression model where the dependent variable, consensus implied return (iret) is 
regressed on stock’s Aggregate Score rank and control variables. Quarter fixed effects are included in each regression 
and standard errors are clustered at firm and quarter level. Each quarter we collect the most recent price target estimates 
by an analyst over the prior 12 months for a stock and compute the implied return for the stock by each analyst. 
Implied return is analyst target price/the prior day stock price -1. Both target prices and stock prices are manually split 
adjusted. Column (1) to (3) include all stocks in the sample. Column (4) to (6) are generated with restricted sample, 
which requires an analyst to cover the same stock in the 12 months prior to quarter t-6 and quarter t. Column (2) and 
(5) include stocks in the top two aggregate score ranks. Column (4) and (6) include stocks in the bottom two aggregate 
score ranks. Dividend yield is calculated as the dividend payment of the prior year, divided by the market value of 
common equity at the end of the prior fiscal year. SUE is standardized unexpected earnings. Volume is the percentile 
based on average daily stock trading volume over shares outstanding over past 6 months in the listed stock exchange. 
Size is natural log of stock market capitalization (in thousands dollars). LTGREV is change in analysts’ consensus long 
term growth forecast. FY1_bias is the difference between analysts’ consensus one-year ahead EPS forecasts and the 
corresponding actual EPS, scaled by stock prices when the consensus target prices are computed. External financing 
is the amount of external financing scaled by the average total assets. 
 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 IRET IRET IRET  IRET IRET IRET 
 Full sample  Restricted sample 
 All Long Short  All Long Short 
Agg. score rank -0.013*** -0.007** -0.030***  -0.013*** -0.008** -0.031*** 
 (-8.06) (-2.31) (-7.02)  (-8.19) (-2.15) (-6.30) 
Inst. ownership -0.072*** -0.056*** -0.077***  -0.039*** -0.028* -0.043** 
 (-4.77) (-3.11) (-4.12)  (-2.59) (-1.66) (-1.98) 
52weekhigh dummy -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.026***  -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.021*** 
 (-5.75) (-4.77) (-5.45)  (-5.81) (-4.07) (-5.28) 
size -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.014***  -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.008*** 
 (-7.63) (-7.09) (-6.86)  (-3.97) (-3.63) (-3.82) 
Dividend yield -0.600*** -0.375** -0.719***  -0.813*** -0.537*** -1.006*** 
 (-4.94) (-2.08) (-4.83)  (-6.16) (-2.93) (-6.14) 
Idio. volatility 4.608*** 3.910*** 4.794***  4.543*** 3.810*** 4.774*** 
 (10.00) (8.56) (8.98)  (7.64) (7.28) (6.82) 
Illiquidity 0.136*** 0.147*** 0.117**  0.273*** 0.360*** 0.171 
 (3.75) (3.43) (2.08)  (4.64) (6.14) (1.43) 
volume 0.003 -0.006 0.005  0.006 -0.005 0.009 
 (0.25) (-0.40) (0.40)  (0.54) (-0.41) (0.67) 
External Financing 0.073*** 0.036** 0.089***  0.077*** 0.051*** 0.086*** 
 (6.74) (2.52) (6.34)  (6.32) (3.85) (4.29) 
FY1_bias 0.186*** 0.279** 0.120  0.093 0.220* 0.020 
 (3.05) (2.36) (1.63)  (1.26) (1.68) (0.20) 
LTGREV 0.001*** 0.000 0.001***  0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 
 (3.87) (0.79) (3.50)  (3.48) (0.73) (3.26) 
Quarter fixed effects Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
No. observations 58743 20191 25616  48001 16917 20174 
Adjusted R-square 0.336 0.263 0.365  0.212 0.161 0.233 
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Table 1.6 Brokerage Firms’ Academic Sophistication Persistence (Recommendation 
Sample) 
This table shows the persistence of brokerage firms’ academic sophistication (e.g., whether the broker’s 
recommendations are consistent or contrary to anomaly prescription). Each quarter, stock-analyst level 
recommendation (REC) is regressed on stock aggregate score rank (Aggregate Score rank), brokerage fixed effect, 
interaction term (brokerage fixed effect × Aggregate Score rank) and control variables. Brokerage firms are then 
sorted into quartiles based on their interaction coefficients each quarter. This table reports the average of interaction 
coefficient across brokerage firms in each quartile portfolio in the formation quarter and subsequent four quarters. We 
also report the average quartile rank of brokerage firms in each quartile and the retention ratio, which is the percentage 
of brokerage firms that stay in the same quartile over the subsequent four quarters. No. brokerage firm is the average 
number of brokerage firms in each quartile each quarter. Brokerage firms need to cover more than 10 stocks to be 
included in the sample. 
 
 Quarter 
Current Quarter Portfolio Formation quarter Q+1 Q+2 Q+3 Q+4 
Consistency Quartiles      
Q1 Interaction coefficient -0.2707 -0.1311 -0.0467 -0.0159 -0.0029 
Coefficient t stat -10.04 -4.90 -1.80 -0.59 -0.11 
Retention ratio 100.00% 54.61% 41.18% 35.26% 31.46% 
Quartile rank 1.0 1.8 2.2 2.3 2.4 
No. brokerage firms 26.6 24.7 23.6 22.7 21.9 
      
Q2 Interaction coefficient -0.0385 -0.0210 -0.0137 -0.0133 -0.0071 
Coefficient t stat -1.66 -0.88 -0.58 -0.55 -0.29 
Retention ratio 100.00% 40.86% 36.06% 33.30% 33.95% 
Quartile rank 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5 
No. brokerage firms 27.1 26.5 25.8 25.2 24.6 
      
Q3 Interaction coefficient 0.0390 0.0151 0.0048 0.0063 0.0115 
Coefficient t stat 1.69 0.63 0.19 0.26 0.46 
Retention ratio 100.00% 39.28% 34.36% 32.10% 30.89% 
Quartile rank 3.0 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6 
No. brokerage firms 27.5 26.7 26.1 25.6 25.1 
      
Q4 Interaction coefficient 0.2970 0.1580 0.0677 0.0233 -0.0192 
Coefficient t stat 12.09 5.97 2.51 0.85 -0.69 
Retention ratio 100.00% 53.96% 41.49% 34.25% 31.10% 
Quartile rank 4.0 3.2 2.9 2.7 2.6 
No. brokerage firms 26.9 25.0 23.9 22.8 21.9 
      
Q4-Q1 (interaction coeff.) 0.5678 0.2891 0.1144 0.0392 -0.0163 






Table 1.7 Brokerage Firms’ Academic Sophistication Persistence (Target Price Sample) 
This table shows the persistence of brokerage firms’ academic sophistication (e.g., whether the target price estimates 
from a broker are consistent or contrary to anomaly prescription). Each quarter, each analyst’ implied return (iret) is 
regressed on stock’s Aggregate Score rank, brokerage fixed effect, the interaction term (brokerage fixed effect × 
Aggregate Score rank) and control variables. Iret in quarter t by analyst i for stock j is calculated using the most recent 
target price by analyst i for stock j over the prior 12 months to quarter t. Brokerage firms are sorted into quartiles 
based on the coefficient of the interaction terms each quarter. We report the average quartile interaction coefficient in 
the formation quarter and subsequent four quarters. We also report the average quartile rank of brokerage firms in 
each quartile and the retention ratio, which is the percentage of brokerage firms that are in the same quartile over the 
subsequent four quarters. No. brokerage firm is the average number of brokerage firms in each quartile each quarter. 
Brokerage firms need to cover more than 5 stocks to be included in the sample. 
 
 Quarter 
Current Quarter Portfolio Formation quarter Q+1 Q+2 Q+3 Q+4 
Consistency Quartiles      
Q1 Interaction coefficient -0.0788 -0.0372 -0.0224 -0.0131 -0.0137 
Coefficient t stat -9.88 -5.68 -3.37 -1.99 -1.84 
Retention ratio 100.00% 49.64% 40.15% 32.32% 30.82% 
Quartile rank 1.00 1.90 2.18 2.37 2.41 
No. brokerage firms 27.5 25.1 24.0 22.5 21.8 
      
Q2 Interaction coefficient -0.0200 -0.0138 -0.0107 -0.0084 -0.0073 
Coefficient t stat -3.04 -2.10 -1.62 -1.25 -1.10 
Retention ratio 100.00% 40.08% 35.73% 32.14% 32.25% 
Quartile rank 2.00 2.30 2.41 2.45 2.47 
No. brokerage firms 27.9 27.2 26.7 26.0 25.6 
      
Q3 Interaction coefficient 0.0005 -0.0028 -0.0043 -0.0050 -0.0062 
Coefficient t stat 0.07 -0.43 -0.64 -0.73 -0.90 
Retention ratio 100.00% 40.82% 35.02% 32.74% 33.33% 
Quartile rank 3.00 2.70 2.62 2.58 2.54 
No. brokerage firms 28.4 27.8 27.3 26.6 26.0 
      
Q4 Interaction coefficient 0.0523 0.0189 0.0066 -0.0009 -0.0029 
Coefficient t stat 7.92 2.73 0.93 -0.13 -0.42 
Retention ratio 100.00% 51.58% 39.58% 33.43% 29.83% 
Quartile rank 4.00 3.12 2.81 2.66 2.59 
No. brokerage firms 27.6 25.2 23.8 22.7 21.4 
      
Q4-Q1 (interaction coeff.) 0.1311 0.0562 0.0270 0.0122 0.0102 







Table 1.8 Performance of Brokerage Firms’ Recommendation and Target Prices 
This table reports the Fama French monthly alpha of strategies following recommendations (Panel A) and target prices 
(Panel B) issued by academically sophisticated and non-academically sophisticated brokerage firms. At the end of 
quarter q, brokerage firms are sorted into quartiles based on the coefficients of the interaction term between stock’s 
aggregate score rank and brokerage firm fixed effects from regression (5) or (6). Top quartile brokerages firms are 
labeled as academically sophisticated and bottom quartile brokerage firms are labeled as non-sophisticated. In the 
subsequent quarter q+1, for each stock we compute the average recommendation (implied return) issued by (non) 
sophisticated brokerage firms and sort those stocks into terciles based on their average recommendation (implied 
return) value. Stocks with average recommendation (implied return) levels in the top tercile are labeled buy and stocks 
in the bottom tercile are labeled by sell. We calculate monthly value weighted stock return of each tercile in quarter 
q+2 using stock market capitalization at the end of quarter q+1. In each panel within each tercile, the first row shows 
the Fama French monthly alpha, the second row shows the t statistics in the parentheses and the third row shows the 
average number of stocks in each tercile each month. Brokerage firms need to cover more than 10 stocks in the 
recommendation sample and more than 5 stocks in the target price sample. 
 







brokerages Diff  
Panel A FF monthly alpha of following stock recommendations 
  Average recommendation tercile       
Sell Alpha 1 -0.0004 0.0016 -0.0020 
 t-stat  (-0.31) (1.55) (-1.34) 
 No. stocks  248.1 266.5  
  2 0.0017 -0.0006 0.0023 
   (1.41) (-0.62) (1.52) 
   197.7 219.3  
Buy  3 0.0010 -0.0018 0.0028 
   (0.88) (-1.67) (1.72) 
   221.9 234.1  
Buy - Sell  0.0014 -0.0033 0.0047 
   (0.76) (-2.19) (1.98) 
Panel B FF monthly alpha of following implied returns (derived from target prices) 
  Average implied return tercile       
Sell  1 0.0001 -0.0005 0.0006 
   (0.11) (-0.49) (0.43) 
   292.3 296.3  
  2 -0.0010 -0.0019 0.0009 
   (-0.80) (-1.56) (0.62) 
   307.6 311.4  
Buy  3 -0.0050 -0.0054 0.0004 
   (-2.81) (-2.50) (0.21) 
   306.3 312.5  
Buy - Sell  -0.0051 -0.0049 -0.0002 





Table 1.9 Institutional Investor’s All-Star Analysts and Analysts’ Experience 
This table examines whether star analysts and analysts’ experiences are associated with academic sophistication. We 
run Fama Macbeth regression and adjust standard errors in Newey West procedure with 4 quarter lags in this test. 
Panel A reports the time series average coefficients of each independent variable from Tobit regression 𝑟𝑒𝑐 = 𝛼 +
𝛽1𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 × 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡
′𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 +
+𝛽5𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 × 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡
′𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠. Panel B reports the time series mean of 
each coefficients from the OLS regression 𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟 ×
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡
′𝑠 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 ×
𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡′𝑠 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 over all the quarters in the sample period. Aggregate Score rank is the 
aggregate score rank for each stock. Star is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the analyst who issues the 
recommendation (or target price) is among the top three research teams by Institutional Investor magazine.  
 
Panel A FM-Tobit regression in recommendation sample 
 Coefficient t-Value P-value 
Aggregate score rank  0.0020 0.49 0.6283 
Star analyst dummy -0.1142*** -7.99 <.0001 
Aggregate score rank × Star analyst dummy -0.0164*** -2.94 0.0052 
Analyst special experience -0.0018 -1.02 0.3138 
Aggregate score rank × Analyst special experience  0.0018*** 3.16 0.0028 
Earnings-to-price ratio  0.2800*** 3.59 0.0008 
Sales growth  0.3281*** 12.57 <.0001 
Total accruals/total assets  0.1742*** 4.08 0.0002 
Institutional ownership  0.1532*** 5.90 <.0001 
Size  0.0018 0.55 0.582 
SUE  0.0428*** 9.94 <.0001 
Volume -0.1884*** -8.20 <.0001 
Top brokerage dummy -0.1590*** -8.03 <.0001 
Panel B FM-OLS regression in target price sample    
 Coefficient t-Value P-value 
Aggregate score rank -0.0108*** -4.15 0.000 
Star analyst dummy -0.0164*** -9.27 0.000 
Aggregate score rank × Star analyst dummy  0.0016 1.32 0.192 
Analyst general experience  0.0011*** 5.04 0.000 
Aggregate score rank × Analyst general experience  0.0004* 1.76 0.086 
52 week high dummy -0.0187*** -5.99 0.000 
Dividend yield -0.5125*** -5.59 0.000 
External Financing  0.0840*** 8.94 0.000 
Idiosyncratic volatility  2.1951*** 6.84 0.000 
Illiquidity  0.2236* 1.91 0.062 
Inst. ownership  -0.0289*** -4.35 0.000 
Top brokerage dummy  -0.0423*** -8.92 0.000 






Table 1.10 Quintile Anomaly Portfolio Quarterly Alphas in the Subsequent 12 Months 
This table shows the quarterly three factor alphas of calendar time (quintile) anomaly portfolio formed each quarter. 
The quintile rank value is from -2 to 2, where 2 indicates long leg and -2 indicates short leg. UMO means “undervalued 
minus overvalued”, where undervalued portfolio (the portfolio investors should long) includes firms with equity/debt 
repurchases and no equity/debt issuances over the prior two fiscal years. Overvalued portfolio (the portfolio investors 
should short) includes firms with equity/debt repurchases but no issuances over the prior two fiscal years. Neutral 
portfolio contains the rest firms. Stocks in the undervalued portfolio receive value 2 for umo_rank, stocks in the 
overvalued portfolio receive value -2 for umo_rank and stocks in the neutral portfolio receive value 0 for umo_rank. 
Annual anomaly portfolios are formed each June and the table shows the average quarterly return in the subsequent 
12 months. For the top quintile momentum and aggregate anomaly score portfolios, in calendar quarter t, we equal 
weigh the quarterly return of the top quintiles formed in calendar quarter t-1, t-2, t-3 and t-4. Moving to calendar 
quarter t+1, we drop the top quintile formed in calendar quarter t-4 and add the top quintile formed in calendar t. 
Utilities, financial stocks as well as stock with price less than $5 are excluded from the computation. In panel A, 
returns of stocks in each quintile are value weighted based on the market capitalization at the formation date and the 
weights are remained during the holding period. For BM anomaly, three factor alphas are generated without HML as 





NOA GP IVA OSC B/M* MOM UMO* 
Agg. anomaly 
score 
Panel A Value weighted quarterly three factor alphas (%) in 4 quarters holding period 
Short  -2 -1.05 -1.65 -0.83 -1.51 -0.30 -0.70 -0.68 -1.65 
 -1 -0.18 -0.85 0.01 -0.20 0.18 0.03 -- -0.11 
 0 0.21 0.07 0.41 -0.00 0.50 0.08 -0.01 0.12 
 1 0.57 0.32 0.38 0.10 0.38 0.20 -- 0.45 
Long  2 0.75 0.77 0.45 0.34 0.87 0.38 0.46 0.84 
          
Long-short 1.80 2.42 1.28 1.86 1.17 1.06 1.14 2.49 
    (3.7) (3.6) (3.0) (3.8) (1.8) (1.5) (3.3) (6.1) 
Panel B Equal weighted quarterly three factor alphas (%) in 4 quarters holding period 
Short  -2 -1.37 -1.54 -1.67 -1.20 -1.30 -1.00 -1.45 -2.07 
 -1 0.08 -1.16 -0.22 -0.39 0.07 -0.06 -- -0.21 
 0 0.42 -0.15 0.42 -0.01 0.63 0.32 -0.34 0.30 
 1 0.44 0.32 0.63 0.14 0.73 0.47 -- 0.73 
Long  2 0.48 0.76 0.49 0.24 1.05 0.09 0.48 1.07 
          
Long-short 1.86 2.30 2.15 1.44 2.35 1.09 1.93 3.12 












Table 1.11 Replication of Table 2 in Edelen et al. (2016) 
Following method in Edelen et al. (2016), each June in year t we form anomaly portfolios based on the anomaly 
characteristics (i.e., NOA, IVA, GP, BM, OSC, UMO) into terciles and compute the monthly portfolio excess return 
and Fama French alpha (for BM portfolio the alpha is generated in regression where independent variables are SMB 
and market excess return) in the subsequent 12 months (holding period of annual updated anomalies are 12 months, 
which is different from the holding period for momentum). Momentum portfolios are formed at the end of each 
calendar quarter with a holding period of three months skipping one month after formation. The long portfolios include 
stocks in the top 30% outperforming tails and the short portfolio include stocks in the top 30% underperforming tails. 
Portfolio AVG takes an equal position across the seven anomalies (we equal weight the monthly portfolio return across 
the six individual anomalies and run time series Fama French three factor regression to generate alpha). 
Heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. Utilities, financial and stocks with price less than $5 are 
excluded. Returns in each portfolio during holding period are value weighted based on the market capitalization of 
component stocks at the formation date. The sample period is from 1982 to 2012. 
 
    NOA GP IVA OSC B/M MOM UMO AVG 
    Panel A: monthly excess return (%) 
Long leg  0.86 0.88 0.88 0.73 0.93 0.94 0.89 0.87 
Short leg  0.43 0.35 0.36 0.62 0.56 0.47 0.28 0.43 
Long - short 0.43 0.53 0.52 0.10 0.37 0.47 0.61 0.44 
    (3.7) (3.6) (4.2) (0.7) (2.1) (3.3) (3.9) (5.2) 
    Panel B: monthly three factor alphas (%) 
Long leg  0.14 0.22 0.15 0.04 0.22 0.27 0.15 0.13 
Short leg  -0.37 -0.54 -0.42 -0.28 -0.24 -0.41 -0.50 -0.38 
Long - short 0.50 0.76 0.57 0.32 0.46 0.68 0.65 0.50 



























Table 1.12 Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Net operating asset 
rank 
Net operating asset (NOA) is calculated as the sum of short-term debt (DLC), 
long-term debt (DLTT), minority interest (MIB), preferred stock (PSTK), and 
common equity (CEQ) minus cash and short-term investment (CHE), deflated 
by lagged total assets (AT).Net operating asset rank is the quintile anomaly 
rank based on stocks’ net operating assets value, and value is between -2 and 




Investment-to-Assets (IVA) is calculated as the change in gross property, 
plant, and equipment (PPEGT) plus the change in inventories (INVT), 
deflated by the lagged total assets (AT). Investment-to-asset rank is the 
quintile anomaly rank based on stocks’ investment to asset value, and value 
is between -2 and 2. -2 represents short leg and 2 represents long leg 
 
Gross profitability rank Gross Profitability (GP) is calculated as the total revenues (REVT) minus cost 
of goods sold (COGS), divided by total assets (AT).  
Gross profitability rank is the quintile anomaly rank based on stocks’ gross 
profitability value, and value is between -2 and 2. -2 represents short leg and 
2 represents long leg 
 
Ohlson score rank Ohlson score (OSC) is calculated following Ohlson (1980) which uses 
information of leverage, total assets, total liability, working capital, net 
income and cash flow from operation. Ohlson score rank is the quintile 
anomaly rank based on stocks’ Olson score value, and value is between -2 and 
2. -2 represents short leg and 2 represents long leg 
 
Book-to-Market rank Book-to-Market ratio (BM) is calculated as shareholders equity (stockholder 
equity or total common equity plus preferred stock par value or total assets 
minus total liabilities and minority interest) minus preferred stock value 
(using redemption, liquidating or carrying value). Book-to-market rank is the 
quintile anomaly rank based on stocks’ book-to-market ratios, and value is 
between -2 and 2. -2 represents short leg and 2 represents long leg 
 
Momentum rank Momentum (MOM) is calculated using stocks’ return in prior 12 month 
returns. Momentum rank is the quintile anomaly rank based on stocks’ past 12 
month returns, and value is between -2 and 2. -2 represents short leg and 2 




Undervalued minus overvalued (UMO): the undervalued portfolio includes 
firms that have equity or debt repurchase and no equity or debt issuances 
during the two most recent fiscal years and the overvalued portfolio include 
firms that have either equity or debt issuance but no equity or debt repurchases 




The aggregate anomaly score is the summation of individual quintile anomaly 
ranks across NOA, IVA, GP, OSC, BM and MOM. By construction, the value 





Table 1.12 Continued 
Variable Definition 
aggregate score rank This is the quintile rank based on stock aggregate anomaly score. Value of 
aggregate score rank is from -2 to 2, with -2 represent the bottom quintile 
(short leg of anomaly) and 2 represent the top quintile (long leg of anomaly) 
 
52 week high dummy 
(d_52weekhigh) 
a dummy variable which equals one if the average daily stock price over the 
most recent quarter is above 95% of the highest stock price over the prior 12 
months. 
 





EP is the rolling sum of EPS for preceding four quarters, deflated by price at 




The amount of external financing scaled by the average total assets 
=
(𝑆𝑆𝑇𝐾 − 𝑃𝑅𝑆𝑇𝐾𝐶 − 𝐷𝑉 + 𝐷𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑆 − 𝐷𝐿𝑇𝐸 + ∆𝐷𝐿𝐶)







The difference between analysts’ consensus one-year ahead EPS forecasts and 
the corresponding actual EPS, scaled by stock prices when the consensus 




Amihud liquidity (Illiq) Calculated with the following formula using data over the twelve months 









𝑟𝑖𝑡 is daily returns and 𝐷𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 is daily dollar trading volume (price x volume) 
for stock i on day t. 𝐷𝑖 is the number of days with available ratio over the 





The quarterly shares owned by institutional investors over the total shares 
outstanding. Observations with greater than 100% aggregate institutional 











which is the rolling sum of sales for preceding four quarters over the rolling 
sum of sales for second preceding set of four quarters and T is the most recent 
quarter for which an earnings announcement was made a minimum two 





Table 1.12 Continued 
Variable Definition 
Long term growth 
revision (LTGREV) 









the nominator is the unexpected earnings for quarter T, with EPS defined as 
earnings per share (diluted) excluding extraordinary items, adjusted for stock 
distributions and the denominator is the standard deviation of unexpected 
earnings over eight preceding quarters (quarter T-7 to quarter T) 
 
  
Total accrual over total 
assets (TA) 
(∆𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑇 − ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑇) −
(∆𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑇 − ∆𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑇) −
∆𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠𝑇 − 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛&𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑇
(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑇 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑇−4)/2
 
T is the most recent quarter for which an earnings announcement was made a 
minimum two months prior to the end of quarter q with T >= q-4. The timeline 
in the end of this document show more detail about T 
 
Volume First calculate the average (daily trading volume over shares outstanding) 
during the past six months prior to the end of quarter q, then sort the average 
daily turnover within the stocks’ listed exchange (NYSE,AMEX or 
NASDAQ) into 100 percentiles (i.e., 0 to 99) and then converted the percentile 
into 0 and 1 by dividing by 99. Volume is between 0 and 1. 
  
Dividend yield (Div_y) Calculated as the dividend payment of the prior year, divided by the market 




Measured by standard deviation of the residual in Fama French 3 factor 














































Being elected as Institutional Investor’s (II) All-star is an important accolade for sell side analysts. 
Prior studies have treated II-voted star analysts as a homogenous group. However, there is substantial 
heterogeneity among institutional investors that comprise the population of voters (i.e., hedge funds vs. 
traditional long-only asset managers). Due to significantly different investment strategies, we conjecture 
that hedge funds value different sell side analysts’ qualities than other traditional asset managers. Using a 
novel dataset which identifies the best sell side analysts voted by hedge funds only, we show that hedge 
funds favored analysts provide more frequent research updates and have better stock picking skills than star 
analysts favored by non-hedge funds institutional investors. 
1. Introduction 
 
Being selected by institutional investor as a star analyst is substantial for sell side analysts. Each 
year, the Institutional Investor magazine (II magazine hereafter) sends out a survey to research directors, 
money managers and buy side analysts in major asset management firms, collects their votes awarded to 
their favored sell side analysts and publishes the All-America Research Team (AART) ranking. The goal 
of AART (star analyst hereafter) ranking is not simply ranking stock pickers, but to “help the institutions 
decide what they will read, and who they will follow, for context and perspective”20. Studies find that star 
analysts are better than non-star analysts at forecasting earnings and picking stocks (Stickel (1992), (Leone, 
Wu (2007)), star analyst recognition is strongly associated with sell side analysts’ compensation 
(Groysberg, Healy and Maber (2011)) and promotion (Leone, Wu (2007)).   
However, just as existing literature has recognized the heterogeneity among institutional investors 
(Bushee (1998), Yan and Zhang (2007)), a heterogeneous group of institutional investors is responsible for 
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the selection of star analysts. Among all the institutional investors, hedge funds are a special group of 
investors that adopt trading strategies which may not be available to traditional asset managers. For 
example, the access to short selling and financial derivatives. Over the past few decades, the hedge fund 
industry is becoming more relevant as traditional money managers, such as pension funds, are allocating 
assets to hedge funds21.  
Due to the differences in investment strategy, hedge funds and traditional money managers could 
value different qualities of sell side analysts. Some anecdotes suggest this could be the story. For example, 
one portfolio manager in hedge fund Angelo, Gordon & Company22 says “At a long-short hedge fund, 
you’re looking to exploit small market inefficiencies or build a core position for maybe a 12-month time 
horizon. It’s a different mentality from that of a big mutual fund, which may take a while to accumulate a 
position and then hold it longer.” From the perspective of sell side analysts, Lehman Brother’s Robert 
Willens, who was the No.1 best analyst voted by hedge funds in the area of accounting & tax policy in 
200623 , says “I speak almost exclusively to hedge funds at this point. Institutional investors are not 
interested in my research because it is best suited for making a particular trade rather than speaking to the 
long-term health of a company.” 
This paper aims to examine heterogeneity among sell side analysts by using a novel dataset. The II 
magazine star analyst ranking described above is well examined in prior analyst literature to proxy for skill 
and reputation. However, another star analyst ranking published by the sister magazine of II magazine, 
Institutional Investor’s Alpha magazine (Alpha magazine hereafter), has received little attention in the 




21 “A growing number of institutional investors are building up their hedge fund portfolios to more than $1 billion. 
Over the past year 36 investors have joined Preqin’s Billion-Dollar Club ranking of investors putting more than $1 
billion into hedge funds, …This group of investors now accounts for 24 percent of total hedge fund industry assets 
under management, according to the study. Preqin points out that public pension funds account for the biggest group, 
representing 28 percent of the capital in the Billion Dollar Club.”—Institutional investor’s alpha magazine (May, 
2017) 
22 Quotes are from Institutional Investor’s alpha (2006 November/December Issue) 





literature. Different from II magazine, who uses votes from all the institutional investors (including hedge 
funds) in the survey as we discussed above, the Alpha magazine recounts votes only from hedge funds and 
generates a hedge fund version of All-America research team (sell side analysts) each year. Thus, we 
investigate whether hedge funds value different analyst attributes and abilities more or less than other 
institutional investors.  
We find that both star analyst rankings have low turnover rates. In the subsequent one and two 
years, about 74.5% and 63.5% analysts, including the 1st, 2nd and 3rd places, remain on the II magazine star 
analyst ranking respectively. For the Alpha magazine ranking, the retention ratios of top three teams are 
70.8% and 59.5% in the subsequent one and two years, respectively. The two rankings also have overlap—
about 60% of the star analyst population show up in both rankings. Having overlap is not surprising by 
construction because the Alpha magazine star analyst ranking is based on a subset of votes that are used to 
generate the II magazine star analyst ranking. The fact that we do not have the data of star analysts voted 
by non-hedge fund institutions biases against us finding differences between the two populations.  
We find that hedge funds preferred analysts generate forecasts more frequently. However, we do 
not find significant differences in terms of forecast accuracy and forecast boldness among the two types of 
star analysts. In the recommendation space, hedge funds favored analysts are significantly more likely to 
issue sell recommendation and their recommendation revisions have greater stock market impacts. 
This paper adds to the understanding about interactions between sell side analysts and various types 
of institutional investors. Prior studies on this topic either investigate mutual fund managers or institutional 
investors in aggregate. For example, Cheng, Liu and Qian (2006) find that on average buy side analyst 
research is more important in the decision making process of US equity fund managers than sell side analyst 
research. Mola and Guidolin (2009) show that sell side analysts are more likely to assign favorable ratings 
to stocks after analysts affiliated mutual funds invest in the stock. Busse, Green and Jegadeesh (2012) use 
institutional investors’ trading data and show that buy side trades follow sell side analyst research, but not 
the other way round. Brown, Wei and Wermers (2013) document that mutual funds trade together into 





Jame, Markov and Subasi (2014) and Kirk and Markov (2016) show broker-hosted conference calls and 
firm-held analyst/investor days, respectively, are an important disclosure medium. However, these studies 
do not acknowledge the heterogeneity among institutional investors, which we think is important for a 
better understanding of sell side analysts’ role in the capital market. One possible reason for such a gap in 
the literature is that we cannot directly observe the qualities valued by different investors (e.g., hedge funds 
vs. non-hedge funds). The data we use in this paper shows investors’ revealed preferences — the best 
analysts in each industry from their perspective. Comparing the differences in investors’ revealed 
preferences allows us to detect qualities valued by different investors.  
This paper also contributes to the literature on cross sectional heterogeneity among sell side 
analysts. The popularity of star analyst designation motivates academic research on the quality of star 
analysts. Two frequently examined star analyst rankings include Institutional Investor’s All-America 
research team (Merkley, Michaely, Pacelli (2017)) and Wall Street Journal’s “star stock picker” 
(Groysberg, Healy and Maber (2011)). As we discussed earlier, the former surveys large buy side 
institutional investors and aggregates their votes to rank the top analysts in each industry while the latter 
ranks top analysts purely based on the performance of analysts’ stock recommendations24. The results on 
star/non-star analysts’ quality are mixed. For example, Emery and Li (2009) find that WSJ star analysts 
give worse stock recommendations after they become stars. Fang, Yasuda (2014) show that star analysts’ 
recommendations are more profitable than non-star analysts’ recommendations. We conjecture that the 
above two star analyst rankings might not fully capture sell side analysts’ qualities valued by different 
clients, and by examining a novel dataset we are able to directly identify analysts preferred by different 
types of institutional investor —hedge funds vs. non-hedge funds institutions in this paper. We examine 
these two groups of investors for several reasons: 1) institutional investors in aggregate are very influential 
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in the market (e.g., in 2010 they hold about 67% of equity25 in the US stock market) and they are a major 
client of sell side analysts’ research, 2) the difference between hedge funds and non-hedge funds 
institutional investors is stronger than the differences among long-only asset managers, 3) the hedge fund 
industry is growing and becoming more relevant in recent years.  
We begin our study by examining the characteristics of star analysts ranking by II magazine and 
Alpha magazine. We show that II magazine star analyst ranking is highly persistent over time. Between 
2004 and 2015, about 72% (57.3%) first team analysts remain the first team in the subsequent one (two) 
year(s). During the same time period, regardless of rank, about 74.5% and 63.5% of the II star analysts stay 
in the top three positions in the subsequent one and two years. In contrast, star analyst ranking voted by 
hedge funds are less persistent over time. The top three analysts (regardless of ranking) have a retention 
ratio of 70.8% and 59.5% in the subsequent one and two years, while the first team analysts have a retention 
ratio of 59.9% and 49%. We examine the differences in II magazine ranking and Alpha magazine ranking 
by decomposing star analysts into three mutually exclusive groups. Each year there are on average 205 star 
analysts (including the top three in each industry) in total, 126 (61.9%) of them show up in both rankings 
(common star analysts hereafter), 40 (19.4%) of them show up only in the Alpha magazine ranking (HF 
star analysts hereafter) and 38 (19.3%) of them show up only in the II magazine ranking (II star analysts 
hereafter). Since star analysts are voted within each industry defined by II magazine, we show that among 
all the industries (about 58 industries each year) covered by the ranking, 21% of them (on average 12 
industries) have completely different top-three best analysts.  
We next show that star analysts cover more stocks and industries than non-star analysts on average. 
Among star analysts, the difference in the breadth of coverage is not economically different, although an 




25 Marshall E. Blume and Donald B. Keim, Working Paper, Institutional Investors and Stock Market Liquidity: Trends 
and Relationships, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania (Aug. 21, 2012), available at 
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~keim/research/ChangingInstitutionPreferences_21Aug2012.pdf, at p.4.  
See, also, The Conference Board, 2010 Institutional Investment Report: Trends in Asset Allocation and Portfolio 





average HF star analysts cover more stocks (15.86) and industries (3.55) than an average II star analysts do 
(14.64 stocks and 3.30 industries on average). We find that star analysts revise earnings forecasts more 
frequently, with an average 7.68 revisions per firm per year by an average HF star analyst and an average 
7.43 revisions per firm per year by an average II star analyst. In the univariate, we do not find significant 
difference in terms of earnings forecast accuracy and boldness among all the sell side analysts, which is 
consistent with findings in Emery and Li (2009). 
There are some differences among stocks covered by each analyst group. On average, stocks 
covered by II star analysts are less volatile, have higher market capitalization, lower trading volume and 
lower sales growth rate than stocks covered by HF star analysts. 
Our regression results show that although star analysts have better forecast accuracy and lower 
forecast boldness than non-star analysts, there is not a statistically significant difference in terms of forecast 
accuracy or boldness among the three star analysts groups. Controlling for analysts’ forecast accuracy, 
boldness, analysts’ general experience, and affiliated brokerage, the multinomial regression results show 
that forecast frequency is associated with a higher probability of being a HF star analyst than an II star 
analyst. Such findings are consistent with hedge fund managers valuing more frequent research due to their 
short term investment horizon. 
We next show that on average HF star analysts issue less optimistic stock recommendations than 
II star analysts. The ordered logit model show that after controlling for firm and analyst characteristics, a 
HF star analyst has a 8% lower probability26 (p-value=0.045)  of issuing strong buy recommendation versus 
non-strong buy recommendations than a non-star analyst on average. In contrast, an II star analyst has a 
3.6% higher probability (p-value=0.46) of issuing strong buy recommendation versus non-strong buy 









recommendation than a non-star analyst on average. Further test shows that HF star analyst and II star 
analyst are statistically different in expressing pessimism in stock recommendations. 
We also find that the market responds differently to recommendation revisions made by different 
star analysts. We show that upward (downward) revisions made by HF star analysts are associated with 
significantly positive (negative) cumulative stock returns in the subsequent six months while 
recommendation revisions made by II star analysts are not. The difference between market responses to HF 
star analysts’ revision and II star analysts’ revisions are statistically significant in the subsequent six 
months. Such findings suggest that HF star analysts provide clients unique information that is not available 
through II star analysts.   
Following Jegadeesh and Kim (2009), we investigate potential herding behavior in analysts’ 
recommendations by examining the stock market response to analysts’ recommendation deviations from 
the consensus. The model in Jegadeesh and Kim (2009) shows that the deviation of the new 
recommendation from the consensus would not impact market if the recommendation revision itself has the 
complete new information. Thus, positive responses from the market to new recommendations that 
positively deviated from the consensus suggest that analysts have incentive to herd. And a negative market 
response to new recommendations that positively deviation from the consensus suggests anti-herding 
incentive. The regression results show that the market does not differentiate between deviations made by 
HF star analysts, II star analysts and non-star analysts.  
In conclusion, this paper investigates cross sectional differences among sell side analysts that are 
associated with their clienteles. We find that hedge fund favored analysts provide more frequent earnings 
forecasts and issue less optimistic stock recommendation. Their recommendation revisions also contain 
unique information that is not available in recommendation revisions made by analysts favored by other 
institutional investors. 
The rest of the paper are organized as the following: section II develops testable hypotheses, section 
III discuss the data and methodology, where the key variables are constructed. Section IV analyzes the 





2. Hypothesis Development 
 
In this section, we discuss the hypotheses examined in this paper. First of all, prior research suggests 
that institutional investors differ in their investment horizon (Bushee (1998), Yan and Zhang (2007)). Hedge 
funds use investment strategies, such as event-driven trades, to take advantage of short term price 
fluctuation. Anecdotes from industry suggest that hedge funds are more interested in short term price 
movements than traditional money managers such as mutual funds or pension funds. For example, an article 
on the October issue of Institutional Investor magazine in 2005 quotes portfolio strategist Francois Trahan 
of Bear, Stearns & Co “With hedge funds all that matters is the next quarter; with mutual funds it was 18 
months.” In the same year, Heather Bellini of UBS, the 2005 hedge fund-voted best sell side analyst in 
software category, is praised by hedge fund Agnos Group for research frequency and incremental 
information that helps pick stocks. Based on these evidence, we conjecture our first hypothesis that HF star 
analysts provide more frequent earnings forecast and stock recommendations compared to II star analysts. 
Because of their different investment approaches it would not be surprising for hedge funds to short 
sell stocks, pension or mutual funds rarely do so. Hence, we conjecture that hedge funds, rather than 
traditional long-only money managers, are more likely to value unfavorable opinions from sell side analysts 
because they can short poor performing stocks. Hedge funds are also more tolerant with investment 
volatility and have a greater appetite for small and midcap stocks than other institutional investors.  
Therefore, our second hypothesis includes that 1) HF star analysts provide less optimistic stock 
recommendations than II star analysts; 2) stocks covered by HF star analysts differ from those covered by 
II star analysts in terms of volatility, size and returns. 
Our third hypothesis is related to potential herding behavior among different analyst segments. 
Specifically, we are interested in two questions: 1) whether hedge fund (or Institutional Investor) star 
analysts are more likely to be the leader who makes the first forecast; 2) whether hedge funds star analysts 
generate bolder earnings forecasts and stock recommendations compared with the consensus than 





herding behavior: reputation and career concern (Scharfstein, Stein (1990), Zwiebel (1995)), information 
cascade (Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, Welch (1992)), self-assessed abilities (Trueman 
(1994)) and highly correlated private information signal (Graham (1999)). For star analysts, the incentive 
to provide unique value-added information to their clients attenuates the likelihood to herd. Hedge fund star 
analysts and institutional investor star analysts could differ in their information sets. In a 2007 interview 
with Institutional Investor’s alpha magazine, Gregory Ransom, the global head of equity research for Bank 
of America Securities said “Hedge funds are continually looking for actionable ideas and proprietary data 
that will give them an edge over their competitors”. Using proprietary data to get an edge is not new for 
sell side analysts. For example, Bank of America’s Daniel Oppenheim, ranked No.2 in homebuilders & 
building products in 2007, developed a proprietary monthly survey of residential real estate agents and has 
helped fund managers identify trade ideas in the subprime mortgage and homebuilding areas. If these 
analysts update their earnings forecast and stock recommendation in a timely fashion which incorporates 
such private information signals, it’s plausible that other analysts would rationally mimic their actions.     
Our last hypothesis focuses on star analysts’ ability to forecast earnings and pick stocks. Different 
from the Wall Street Journal star analyst ranking, which is generated based on the performance of analysts’ 
recommendations, II star analysts and HF star analysts are valued by qualities such as access to 
management, industry expertise and accessibility/responsiveness. In contrast, stock recommendations and 
earnings forecasts are ranked the 10th and 11th in the list of qualities valued by buy side investors from a 
2007 survey by Institutional Investor magazine. Some suggest that buy side clients use the information 
provided by analysts to make their own investment decision instead of following analysts’ stock 
recommendation directly. For example, Stuart Linde, New York based director of Americas equity research 
at Barclays, says “Analysts are being asked to mine their networks of industry contacts for certain data 
points that hedge fund portfolio managers can piece together for their own investment theses.”  Others 
suggest that analysts’ stock recommendations are valued. For example, Steven Tighe, Merrill Lynch’s head 
of Americas equity research, in New York says “Most stocks do not trade like flat liners, so we want 





It’s an empirical question whether there are skill differences inside the star analyst population. Following 
prior literature, we examine earnings forecast error to evaluate analysts’ forecast ability, and buy and hold 
stock returns after recommendation announcement to infer analysts’ stock picking ability. 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
Our data come from the following sources: analysts’ quarterly earnings forecast and stock 
recommendation are from I/B/E/S; stock information and firms’ financial information are from CRSP and 
Compustat, respectively; the Institutional investor star analyst ranking is from the annual Institutional 
Investor All-American research team published by Institutional Investor magazine; and the hedge funds 
star analyst ranking is from the annual hedge funds voted All-American research team published by Alpha 
magazine, a sister publication of Institutional investor magazine. 
The annual All-American research team published by Institutional Investor magazine has been 
frequently examined by prior analyst research. Each year, the magazine sends out survey to large buy side 
institutional investors (e.g., portfolio managers and buy side researchers) and rank sell side research teams 
by counting votes from those institutional investors, including hedge funds. Its sister magazine, Institutional 
Investor’s Alpha (Alpha magazine), extracts only the ballots cast by hedge funds and re-tabulates the 
winners of the election. Therefore, the best analysts ranking published by Alpha magazine is generated from 
a subset of votes that produce the II All-star analysts. We collect the hedge funds star analysts from the 
alpha magazine from 2004 to 2008 and from 2012 to 201627.   
We take the top three research teams (i.e., 1st, 2nd and 3rd places) within each industry in each 
ranking as star analysts and examine four mutually exclusive groups of analysts in this paper: 1) star 
analysts who only show up in the best analyst ranking voted by hedge funds (HF star analysts); 2) star 
analysts who only show up in the best analyst ranking voted by institutional investors (II star analysts); 3) 









star analysts who show up in both best analyst rankings (common star analysts) and 4) non-star analysts 
who are the rest analysts in I/B/E/S database. 
3.1 Analysts earnings forecasts 
We follow Hong, Kubik and Solomon (2000) and Ke and Yu (2006) to create forecast accuracy 
and boldness measures. Our measures are constructed with quarterly earnings forecasts and actual earnings 
realizations. For a given firm in fiscal quarter t, we keep analysts’ forecasts made between the 
announcement of actual earnings of fiscal quarter t and the announcement of actual earnings of fiscal quarter 
t-2.   
To measure forecast accuracy, we first create an analyst-firm level measure using the absolute 
difference between an analyst’ forecast, 𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 and the actual EPS, 𝐴𝑗,𝑡  of firm j as shown in equation (1). 
We use the most recent quarterly EPS forecast issued by analyst i on stock j for fiscal quarter t before the 
announcement of actual earnings: 
𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = |𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐴𝑗,𝑡| (1) 
Since we are interested in cross sectional heterogeneity across the star analyst population, we want to 
compare forecast ability at the analyst level. We next create a measure of analyst level forecast error, which 
attenuates the noise from different stocks covered by the analyst. The method is the same as in Hong, Kubik 
and Solomon (2000). First, we sort all analysts who cover the same stock j in quarter t based on the absolute 
value of their forecast error; then we assign a ranking based on the sorting results in the first step so that 
the analyst that made the most accurate forecast receives 1 as the rank value and the least accurate analyst 
receives N, which is the number of analysts covering stock j, as the rank value28. The rank captures an 
analyst’s relative accuracy among all the analysts covering the same stock. By construction, thinly covered 




28 For the situation where multiple analysts are equally accurate, we follow Hong, Kubik and Solomon (2000) and 





stocks help analysts gain a lower rank that suggests better forecast accuracy. To mitigate such bias, we 
follow Hong et al. (2000) and compute a score for each analyst using equation (2): 
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 100 − [
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 − 1
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡 − 1
] ∗ 100 
(2) 
where 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the rank value assigned to analyst i in the previous step and 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡 is 
the number of analysts covering stock j in the same quarter t29. The higher the value of score, the more 
accurate the forecast 𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is. For example, the most accurate analyst receives 1 for 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 and his/her 
score is 100. For the least accurate analyst, the values of 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  and 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑡 are the same 
and his/her score is 0. Finally, we take average of all the scores analyst i receives for all the stocks s/he 
covers in quarter t as the quarterly analyst level forecast error measure. To further reduce the noise due to 
changes in the set of stocks covered by an analyst over time, we take the average of the four quarterly scores 
before the release of all-star analysts ranking as the annual measure of accuracy. We acknowledge that the 
score measure will be in the extremes for analysts who forecast thinly covered stocks, to help mitigate this 
issue we require each stock to be covered by at least four analysts each quarter in the sample. 
The second key measure based on analysts’ earnings forecast is forecast boldness, which is often 
used in prior studies to infer herding. Similar as before, we first create analyst-firm level forecast deviation 
as in equation (3): 
𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = |𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝐹−𝑖,𝑗,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅| (3) 
𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the first earning forecast made by analyst i to firm j for fiscal quarter t. 𝐹−𝑖,𝑗,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =  
1
𝑛⁄ ∑ 𝐹𝑚,𝑗,𝑡𝑚𝜖−𝑖 , 
where –i is the set of all analysts other than analyst i who forecast earnings of stock j in the same fiscal 
quarter, and n is the number of analysts in the set –i. 𝐹−𝑖,𝑗,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the consensus forecast for stock j in fiscal 
quarter t, the average of the first forecasts (for the same fiscal quarter t) made by all other analysts excluding 









analyst i. Based on the same logic, we create analyst-level boldness scores as we did for the accuracy 
measure above. We do the following steps: 1) sort all the analysts who cover stock j for fiscal quarter t 
based on their earnings deviation from the consensus; 2) assign each analyst a rank value based on the 
sorting results in step one, for example the analyst whose forecast deviates from the consensus the most 
receive a value of one; 3) create a score measure that captures each analyst’s relative boldness and adjust 
for the number of analysts covering the same stock and 4) for each analyst i, take the average of boldness 
scores across all the stocks s/he covers for fiscal quarter t as the analyst level boldness measure. 
3.2 Analyst stock recommendation 
In this section, we discuss variables based on analysts’ stock recommendations. We examine three 
questions related to stock recommendations: 1) do analysts differ in terms of the recommendations they 
give? 2) Does stock market react to recommendations issued by different analysts differently? And 3) Do 
certain analysts provide information by deviating from others’ recommendations?  
The third question is related to herding behavior among analysts. As prior studies point out, using 
analysts’ earnings forecast to infer herding behavior could be problematic because analysts could receive 
the same information about earnings and it’s hard to tell whether analysts are imitating others when they 
revise forecasts towards the consensus (Zitzewitz (2001), Jegadeesh and Kim (2009)). Welch (2000) argues 
that “Tests of informational cascades (Bikhchandani et al. (1992)) should focus on discrete rather than on 
continuous action choice scenarios” because discrete decisions give little room to use private information 
and to experiment with small changes. Jegadeesh and Kim (2009) point out that stock recommendations 
have an advantage in that market incorporates information in the consensus recommendation so that when 
analysts update their recommendation, they are not incorporating stale information in the consensus. In 
contrast, analysts rationally incorporate information in the consensus earnings forecast even if it’s stale 
when they revise earnings forecasts. Therefore we examine analysts’ stock recommendation by following 
Jegadeesh and Kim (2009) and restrict the sample by these rules: 1) for each stock in the sample, there 
should be at least one analyst who issues a recommendation and revises the recommendation within 180 





recommendations30 for the same stock on the day before the revision; 3) the stock return is available on 
CRSP for the stock on the revision date; 4) the stock price is greater than $1 on the day before the 
recommendation revision date. If an analyst makes multiple recommendations during the past 180 days, we 
keep his/her latest two recommendations in the sample to measure the revision. We construct the stock 
recommendation consensus as the following: for each stock recommendation revision made by analyst i on 
date t, the consensus recommendation (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1) is the average of the latest recommendations by 
analysts other than analyst i as of the day before t. The signed deviation of recommendation by analyst i for 
stock j in date t is defined as in equation (4).  
𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1 (4) 
We construct a measure leader-follower ratio (LFR) to identify leader analysts by following 
Cooper, Day, and Lewis (2001) and Jegadeesh and Kim (2009). The intuition is that recommendations that 
are not immediately after the latest recommendations but are immediately followed by other 
recommendations are leaders. To be specific, for each stock recommendation revision in our sample, we 
locate the two recommendations issued by different analysts just before the revision date31 and compute the 
number of days between the revision date and the announcement dates of the two recommendations, 
days_before1 and days_before2. We repeat the same steps, select the two recommendations issued by 
different analysts just after the revision date and compute days_after1 and days_after2. The leader-follower 
ratio (LFR) is defined as in equation (5) for analyst j who made k stock recommendations during a year. A 
high value of LFR suggests higher likelihood of being leader. The variable Leader analyst is one if the 
analyst is in the top 10 percentile in the population based on his/her LFR. 
𝐿𝐹𝑅𝑗 =
∑ (𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠_𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒1𝑗,𝑘 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠_𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒2𝑗,𝑘)
𝐾
𝑘=1









30 Stock recommendation are considered as active if it’s within 180 days from the announcement date. We do this to 
remove stale recommendations. 





3.3 Control variables 
Prior studies have shown that firms’ information environment and analysts’ characteristics impact 
analysts’ earnings forecast (Hartford, Jiang, Wang and Xie (2017)) and stock recommendations (Jegadeesh, 
Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004)). In the multivariate regressions, we include the following firm level and 
analyst level characteristics: cumulative subsequent twelve month stock return, institutional ownership, 
stock’s idiosyncratic volatility, trading volume, sales growth, firm size (i.e., log of market capitalization), 
Amihud illiquidity, dividend yield, capital expenditure, analyst coverage (i.e., number of analysts covering 
the stock), analyst experience (i.e., the number of years the analyst exist in I/B/E/S) and first analyst dummy, 
which is 1 if the analyst makes the first earnings forecast for a stock in a given fiscal quarter. Table 2.9 has 
a detailed description of each control variable. 
4. Empirical Tests and Analysis 
 
We start the analysis by first describing the all-star analyst ranking data. Since we have eight years 
of matched ranking data, including 1st, 2nd and 3rd places of both institutional investor and hedge funds voted 
star analysts, we report summary statistics (e.g., retention ratios) on how persistent each analyst ranking is 
during the subsequent two years after the election year. Table 2.1 shows that both II magazine and Alpha 
magazine rankings are persistent over time. In 2004 there are 61 top one analysts in the II magazine ranking. 
In the next year 2005, 50 of the 61 (81.97%) top analysts remain top analysts in the II magazine ranking. 
In year 2006, 33 of the 61 (54.10%) top analysts in 2004 remain the top one analysts in the II magazine 
ranking. In panel B, we group the top three analysts in each industry. For example, in year 2005, there are 
178 star analysts in the II magazine ranking and 179 star analysts in Alpha magazine ranking. In the next 
year 2006, 133 of the 178 star analysts remain in the top three in II magazine ranking and 124 of the 179 
star analysts remain in the top three in Alpha magazine ranking. Between 2004 and 2015, about 72% 
(57.3%) top one II-star analyst remain the top one in the subsequent one (two) year(s). During the same 
time period, regardless of rank, about 74.5% and 63.5% of the II star analysts stay in the top three in the 





less persistent over time. The top three analysts (regardless of ranking) have a retention ratio of 70.8% and 
59.5% in the subsequent one and two years, while the top one analysts have a retention ratio of 59.9% and 
49%.  
Table 2.2 reports more summary statistics in II magazine ranking and Alpha magazine ranking. We 
segment all-star analysts into one of three mutually exclusive groups (i.e., HF star analysts, II star analysts 
and common star analysts) and then count the number of star analysts in each group each year and report 
the numbers in panel A. For example, in 2004 there are 224 (=43+47+134) star analysts in total, 43 of them 
(20%) only show up in Alpha magazine ranking, 47 of them (20%) only show up in II magazine ranking 
and 134 of them (61%) show up in both rankings. Across the sample period, each year there are on average 
205 star analysts (including the top three in each industry) in total, 126 (61.9%) of them show up in both 
rankings (common star analysts), 40 (19.4%) of them only show up in Alpha magazine ranking (HF star 
analysts) and 38 (19.3%) of them only show up in II magazine ranking (II star analysts). Since the star 
analyst ranking is voted on within individual industry as defined by II magazine, we report the number of 
industries with common star analysts in panel B. For example, in year 2004, there are 61 industries in both 
II magazine and Alpha magazine rankings. Among the 61 industries, 12 of them (19.6%) have completely 
different top three analysts, 20 of them (32.8%) have one common star analyst, 19 of them (31.1%) have 
two common star analysts and 10 of them (16.4%) have the same top three analysts regardless of rank. Over 
the sample period, there are about 58 industries each year, 21% of them (on average 12 industries) have 
completely different top three analysts. 
We next examine analyst characteristics. Using analysts’ quarterly earnings forecast data, we report 
summary statistics for each analyst group in table 2.3. In year t, we keep analysts’ earnings forecasts made 





investors time to evaluate analysts’ forecasts because the star analyst ranking is released in October32. Each 
year we first compute the variable (e.g., number of stocks/industries covered) for each analyst, and then 
take the average across analysts within each analyst group (e.g., HF star analysts, II star analysts). Table 
2.3 reports the time series average of each statistic over years in the sample period. For example, there are 
on average 130 common star analysts, 40 II star analysts, 39 HF star analysts and 3485 non-star analysts in 
each year. Analysts’ experience is the number of years between the forecast year and the first year the 
analyst show up in I/B/E/S database. We show that star analysts are more experienced in general. For each 
analyst group, we count the number of stocks and industries covered by an average analyst. For example, 
an average HF star analyst covers 15.86 stocks (3.55 industries) per year and an average II star analyst 
covers 14.64 stocks (3.30 industries) per year, much higher than the average 9.15 stocks (2.80 industries) 
covered by an average non-star analyst. We further show that besides the high breadth of coverage, star 
analysts also revise forecasts more frequently at the firm level. For example, an average HF star analyst 
makes 7.68 forecasts for a covered firm each year and an average II star analyst makes 7.43 forecasts for a 
covered firm each year.  
Analysts who make the first forecast for a given firm is more likely to be the leader, however we 
acknowledge that this is a coarse herding measure as discussed in prior study (Hong, Kubik and Solomon 
(2000)) and include this statistic to better understand the sample. We report the percentage of first forecasts 
over total number of covered stocks for an average analyst in each group. The statistic suggests that star 
analysts on average make more first earnings forecast measured by the absolute value. Specifically, an 
average II star analyst makes the first forecast for 1.03 out of 14.64 (7.07%) stocks in a year while an 
average HF star analyst makes the first forecast for 1.14 out of 15.86 (7.20%) stocks in a year. An average 









common star analyst makes the first forecast for 1.27 out of 16.53 (7.69%) stocks in a year. In contrast, an 
average non star analyst makes the first forecast for 0.72 out of 9.15 stock.  
We next report univariate statistics on analysts’ forecast accuracy and boldness. As we discussed 
earlier in section 3, the accuracy score ranges between 0 (least accurate) and 100 (most accurate) and 
measures the relative accuracy rank of an analyst among all the analysts covering the same stock. The 
analyst level accuracy score suggests that star analysts have better accuracy than non-star analysts, which 
is consistent with Stickel (1992) and Leone and Wu (2007). Among star analysts, on average II star analysts 
have the highest accuracy score 51.25 and the lowest standard deviations. An average common star analyst 
and HF star analyst have accuracy score of 50.95 and 50.85 respectively. These accuracy score suggests 
that on average if we rank analysts based on their forecast accuracy, II star analyst is followed by common 
star analysts, HF star analysts and non-star analysts at last. The boldness score is similar to accuracy score, 
which ranges between 0 (closest to the consensus) and 100 (deviates the most from the consensus). II star 
analysts and HF star analysts have the same average boldness score, 50.68. In comparison, common star 
analysts and non-star analysts have a lower boldness score, although the economic magnitudes do not differ 
much.  
We complete our summary statistics by examining the characteristics of firms covered by each 
group of analysts. Table 2.4 shows the time series average of cross sectional mean of each firm level 
characteristics in the earnings forecast sample. We construct the sample in the same way as we did in table 
2.3. In year t, we keep the unique stocks covered by all analysts in one of the four mutually exclusive analyst 
groups and match these stocks with firm level characteristics computed at the end of March in year t. We 
follow Jegadeesh and Kim (2009) to construct each variable and winsorize firm characteristics at the 1st and 
99th percentiles each year. We compute each variable for each stock, calculate the cross sectional 
distribution within each analyst group (as well as the difference between II star analysts and HF star 
analysts) and report the time series average of the mean (and t statistic) in table 2.4. The first four columns 
in table 2.4 shows the average characteristics of covered firms by each analyst group, and the last column 





find that firms covered by HF star analysts have lower stock returns in the subsequent 12 months, higher 
idiosyncratic volatility, lower market capitalization and higher sales growth rates than those covered by II 
star analysts. These findings are consistent with the inference that hedge funds have a larger appetite for 
riskier stocks that are smaller and have higher volatility than traditional long-only asset managers, and thus 
have demand for information of these stocks from sell side analysts.  
Following the univariate statistics, we next run multivariate regressions to test our hypotheses. Our 
first regression uses analyst-firm level earning forecast at each quarter. The dependent variable accuracy 
score (or boldness score) is at the individual earnings forecast level, where a high score suggests that this 
forecast is of relative low error compared to forecasts made by other analysts for the given firm in the given 
fiscal quarter. For example, 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 captures the relative accuracy of analyst i among all the 
analysts who cover firm j for fiscal quarter t. The regression is specified as in equation (6) below where we 
control firm and analyst level characteristics.  
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐻𝐹 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝐼 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑜. 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛽5𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
+ 𝛽7𝑁𝑜. 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
+ 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
+ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 
(6) 
We include an HF star analyst dummy, which is equal to one when analyst i only shows up in the 
Alpha magazine ranking in year t. II star analyst dummy is equal to 1 when analyst i only shows up in the 
II magazine ranking in year t. Common star dummy is equal to 1 when analyst i shows up in both II magazine 
and Alpha magazine ranking in year t. No. analyst following is the number of analysts covering stock j for 
fiscal quarter t. First analyst dummy is equal to 1 when analyst i makes the first forecast for stock j in fiscal 





covered is the number of firms covered by analyst i in fiscal quarter t. Top brokerage dummy is equal to 1 
if analyst i is affiliated with a brokerage firm that has more than 20 analysts in year t. We include firm level 
characteristics such as size, idiosyncratic volatility, illiquidity, earnings-to-price ratio, dividend yield, and 
external financing. 
Panel A in Table 2.5 shows the regression results. We report both OLS and Tobit model 
specification as the dependent variable Accuracy score ranges from 0 and 100. We control for firm 
characteristics such as size, earnings-to-price ratio, idiosyncratic volatility, illiquidity, dividend yield and 
external financing. We find that star analysts are significantly associated with better earnings forecast 
accuracy compared with non-star analysts, which is the base level in the regression. For example, the 
coefficients from the Tobit regression model suggest that an average II star analyst has an accuracy score 
that is 1.536 (t-statistic=3.45) higher than that of an average non-star analyst, meaning that if we rank all 
the analysts by their forecast accuracy for the same stock-fiscal quarter, on average II star analyst is ranked 
higher than non-star analyst. Similar interpretations apply to HF star analyst and common star analyst. Since 
we are interested in whether HF star analyst and II star analyst differ in their forecast accuracy, we test the 
hypothesis that the coefficient of HF star analyst equals the coefficient on II star analyst in the regression. 
We report the p-value of the test statistic in the bottom of panel A. The hypothesis cannot be reject as the 
p-values are above 10 percent in all three regression models. Therefore we do not find statistically 
significant evidence that HF star analysts and II star analysts differ in forecast accuracy. The results also 
show that the first forecast is associated with lower accuracy and forecasts from top brokerage are associated 
with higher accuracy. 
We next replace the dependent variable with analyst-firm level boldness score in equation (6). The 
coefficient 0.794 on HF star analyst dummy (t-statistic=2.01) and coefficient 0.819 on II star analyst 
dummy (t-statistic=2.05) are significantly different from zero, suggesting that HF star analyst and II star 
analyst make bolder forecast than non-star analysts. However, the hypothesis that HF star analyst and II 
star analyst do not differ in their forecast boldness cannot be rejected since p-values of the test statistic in 





2.5 examine the relation between analyst characteristics and the choice to make the first forecast for a given 
stock. The dependent variable is first forecast dummy, which equals 1 when analyst i makes the first forecast 
for stock j in fiscal quarter t. The coefficients on II star analyst, -0.013 (in OLS regression) and -0.183 (in 
Logit regression) are both statistically significant, consistent with II star analysts are less likely to issue the 
first forecast. The bottom p-value (0.1219 for OLS regression and 0.817 for Logit regression) in panel A 
are all above 10 percent, showing no evidence that II star analysts and HF star analysts are different in terms 
of being the forecast leader. 
In panel B of table 2.5, we examine factors that are associated with being voted a star analysts. We 
use multinomial logistic regression where the dependent variable has four values, each representing an 
analyst group. The base group is II star analysts. Accuracy score and boldness score are at analyst-year 
level, which are computed by averaging analyst-firm-quarter accuracy (boldness) scores within each analyst 
over the four quarters before each October in year t. No. forecast is the total number of forecasts made by 
the analyst in year t. Top brokerage dummy is 1 when the analyst’s affiliated brokerage has more than 20 
analysts in year t. Percentage of first forecast is the number of first forecast scaled by the number of covered 
firms by the analyst over a four quarter period. We cluster the standard errors at analyst level to allow 
correlation within analyst over time. Panel B in table 2.5 reports the relative risk ratio minus one for each 
independent variable. The regression results suggest that the number of forecasts and affiliation with top 
brokerage firms are characteristics that differ between II star analysts and HF star analysts. Specifically, an 
increasing number of forecasts is associated with a higher likelihood (coefficients=0.002 and p-value less 
than 0.05) of becoming a HF star or common star analyst than II star analyst. Being affiliated with a top 
brokerage firm is associated with lower likelihood (coefficient= -1.058 and p-value=0.051) of becoming 
HF star analyst than II star analyst on average. The coefficients on accuracy score and boldness score are 
consistent with findings in the univariate test and firm level regressions, where we do not find statistically 
significant difference among star analysts in terms of forecast accuracy and boldness. Results in column 





analysts on average are less accurate and bold, make fewer forecasts, have less experience and are less 
likely to be affiliated with top brokerage firm. 
We next move to the stock recommendation sample. Following prior studies, we rescale the value 
of recommendations in I/B/E/S so that value 5 indicates strong buy and value 1 indicates strong sell. First 
of all, we test whether HF star analysts are less optimistic than II star analysts. As we discussed in the 
hypothesis development section, hedge funds are able to short sell and thus would appreciate negative 
opinions. Accordingly, we run ordered logit regression as well as OLS regression for robustness in table 
2.6 where the dependent variable is recommendations made by individual analyst. Equation (7) shows the 
model specification,  
𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐻𝐹 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝐼 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠
+ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 
(7) 
where 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the recommendation made by analyst i for stock j at date t. Leader analyst 
dummy is equal to 1 if analyst i is among the top 10 percentile analysts in year t based on the leader-follower 
ratio (LFR) defined in section 3. Following Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische and Lee (2004) and Dechow, You 
(2013), we control for firm-level characteristics such as size, subsequent 12 months stock return, earnings-
to-price ratio, stock idiosyncratic volatility, Amihud illiquidity, dividend yield and external financing. 
The ordered logit model in table 2.6 shows that HF star analysts are associated with an 8% lower 
probability33 of issuing a strong buy recommendation versus a non-strong buy recommendations than non-
star analysts (p-value=0.045), after controlling for both analyst and firm level characteristics. II star analysts 
are associated with a 3.6% higher probability of issuing a strong buy recommendations versus a non-strong 









buy recommendations than non-star analysts (p-value=0.46) after controlling for both analyst and firm level 
characteristics. We notice that the signs of the coefficient of HF star analyst remain negative in all four 
model specifications and the signs of the coefficient of II star analyst remain positive in all four model 
specifications. As we did previously, we test the null hypothesis that HF star analysts and II star analysts 
do not differ in terms of recommendation optimism. The bottom panel in table 2.6 shows the p-value of the 
null hypothesis H0 under each regression specification. The null (coefficient of HF star equals coefficient 
of II star) is rejected in every specification. For example, in column (4) where we run OLS regression and 
cluster standard errors in firm and quarter level, HF star analyst dummy is negatively associated with 
recommendation value and II star analyst dummy is positively associated with recommendation value. The 
difference in the coefficients between HF star analyst and II star analyst is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. Such findings suggest that HF star analysts are less optimistic in making recommendations than II 
star analysts.  
The recommendation itself does not show analysts’ ability to pick stocks. We next examine the 
information contained in analysts’ recommendations. Specifically, we look into the buy and hold abnormal 
returns in the subsequent six months after the announcement of each recommendation in our sample. The 
buy and hold abnormal return is constructed as in equation (8), where 𝐴𝐵𝑅𝑖(𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝐻) is the abnormal buy 
and hold return between trading day t and trading day t + H for stock i as in Jegadeesh and Kim (2009). 
𝐴𝐵𝑅𝑖(𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝐻) = ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝜏)
𝑡+𝐻
𝜏=𝑡





𝑅𝑖,𝜏  is the daily return of stock i and 𝑅𝑚,𝜏  is the daily market benchmark return. We use CRSP value 
weighted stock index as the market portfolio 34  and examine different holding periods from the 









announcement date (day 0) to the maximum holding period of six calendar month (126 trading days). Our 
model specification is described in equation (9). 
𝐴𝐵𝑅𝑖(𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝐻) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1∆𝑟𝑒𝑐 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐹 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝐼 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡
+  𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 
+𝛽6𝐻𝐹 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑡 × ∆𝑟𝑒𝑐 
+𝛽7𝐼𝐼 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 × ∆𝑟𝑒𝑐 
+𝛽8𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 × ∆𝑟𝑒𝑐 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 × ∆𝑟𝑒𝑐 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 
(9) 
For each recommendation made by analyst i in the sample, ∆𝑟𝑒𝑐 is the signed change in the 
recommendation made by analyst i compared to his/her most recent one for the same stock. Table 2.7      
reports the regression results. We show that ∆𝑟𝑒𝑐 is positively associated with abnormal buy and hold 
returns in the subsequent time periods. For example, one incremental increase in recommendation is 
associated with 1.7% market adjusted abnormal return (t-statistic=21.99) on the announcement date and 
2.3% (t-statistic=15.62) market adjusted abnormal buy and hold return over the subsequent six months. 
Such findings are consistent with those in Womack (1996), which documents market drift over the 
subsequent six months after analysts revise recommendations. What we find interesting is the coefficient 
on the interaction term between HF star analyst and ∆𝑟𝑒𝑐. Revisions made by HF star analysts are positively 
associated with future stock returns over six months. On average, one unit increase of recommendation 
made by HF star analysts are associated with 0.4% market adjusted abnormal return on the recommendation 
announcement date (t-statistic=1.78) and 1.2% market adjusted abnormal return (t-statistic=2.81) in the 
subsequent 126 trading days after the announcement date. In contrast, there is no statistically significant 
association between recommendation revisions made by II star analysts and subsequent abnormal buy and 
hold stock returns. The bottom panel in table 2.7 reports the p-value of the test for the null hypothesis that 





hypothesis is rejected in every buy and hold period. These findings suggest that HF star analysts are 
providing information that is not available from II star analysts35. 
Our last test is related to analysts’ herding behavior. We define herding as moving towards 
consensus that is not due to information. For stock i that receives a recommendation 𝑛𝑒𝑤_𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  from 
analyst j on date t, we define 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠_𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1  as the average of all outstanding active 
recommendations by other analysts as of the day before the revision date. We follow Jegadeesh and Kim 
(2009) and require the 180 calendar days as active period for each recommendation. We then run the model 
specification in equation (10),  
𝐴𝐵𝑅𝑖(𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝐻) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1∆𝑟𝑒𝑐 + 𝛽1
′(𝑛𝑒𝑤_𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠_𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1) +
𝛽2𝐻𝐹 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2
′ 𝐻𝐹 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 × (𝑛𝑒𝑤_𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠_𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1) +
𝛽3𝐼𝐼 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3′𝐼𝐼 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 × (𝑛𝑒𝑤_𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠_𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1) +
 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4′𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 × (𝑛𝑒𝑤_𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 −
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠_𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽5′𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 × (𝑛𝑒𝑤_𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 −
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠_𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠  
(
10) 
where 𝐴𝐵𝑅𝑖(𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝐻) is the buy and hold abnormal return as we defined in equation (9). Deviation is the 
signed difference between 𝑛𝑒𝑤_𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  and 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠_𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1  for stock i on date t when analyst j 
made a recommendation revision. ∆rec is the signed stock recommendation made by analyst j for stock i 
on date t. According to the model in Jegadeesh and Kim (2009), if analysts herd toward consensus without 
information, stock returns will be positively related to the deviations from the consensus. In other words, 
positive coefficients on signed deviation is consistent with analysts in aggregate have incentive to herd. If 
analysts tend to exaggerate recommendations, meaning they intentionally deviate recommendations from 










the consensus, stock returns will be negatively related to the deviations from the consensus and we will 
observe a negative coefficient on the deviation is consistent with this situation. The assumption is that stock 
market incorporates information efficiently, and when analysts tend to herd without information, the market 
values information when certain analyst deviate from the consensus. 
Table 2.8 reports the regression results. We find that signed deviation is positively associated with 
the market adjusted stock returns on announcement day 0 and in every buy and hold period after controlling 
for the recommendation revision. One unit positive deviation from the consensus is associated with 0.5% 
market adjusted return (t-statistic=6.56) in the subsequent three trading days following the announcement 
of the recommendation. The coefficient on deviation is increasing over time and the same one unit positive 
deviation is associated with 1% abnormal market adjusted return in the subsequent six months. Such 
evidence suggests that analysts have the tendency to herd, which is consistent with the finding in Jegadeesh 
and Kim (2009). We next examine whether the market reacts differently to deviations made by different 
star analysts. We interact each signed deviation with the identity of the analyst who makes the revision. We 
find the coefficient on the interaction term with HF star analysts are not statistically different from zero in 
the subsequent six months after the announcement of the recommendation. Similar finding apply to II star 
analysts and common star analysts. We last test the null hypothesis that market do not reacts differently to 
deviations made by HF star and II star analysts and we do not find statistically significant evidence to reject 
the null.  
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we examine whether there are cross sectional differences among sell side star analysts. 
We use a novel dataset which allows us to identify sell side analysts that are considered the best by a unique 
group of buy side institutional investors—hedge funds. Due to the significant differences in investment 
strategies and styles between hedge funds and traditional long-only investors, we conjecture that analysts 
favored by hedge funds might differ in their research frequency and ability to pick stocks. The findings 





industry. Hedge fund voted best analysts cover more stocks and make updates more frequently per firm. 
However, we do not find significant differences in terms of forecast accuracy and forecast boldness between 
hedge funds favored analysts and other star analysts. In the recommendation sample, we find that hedge 
fund star analysts are more likely to express pessimistic opinions than institutional investor star analysts, 
consistent with that fact that hedge funds value unfavorable opinions. Stock markets also respond more 
strongly to recommendation revisions made by hedge fund star analysts, in contrast, we do not have 
significant market response to revisions made by star analysts not favored by hedge funds. In conclusion, 
our findings suggest that there are cross sectional differences among sell side analysts that are associated 
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Table 2.1 All-America Research Team Ranking Persistence 
This table reports the number of analysts on the annual All-America research team ranking published by Institutional Investor magazine and Institutional Investor’s 
Alpha magazine each year between 2004 and 2016. Analysts that cannot be found in I/B/E/S database are excluded from this table. Between 2009 and 2011 Alpha 
magazine did not publish the best analysts picked by hedge funds, therefore statistics are missing in those years. In 2012, we only have the top one analyst in each 
industry voted by hedge funds. In 2016, we only have the top one analyst in each industry voted by institutional investors. Panel A includes only the top one analyst 
in each industry and Panel B includes the top three analysts in each industry on each ranking and. # star Yr 0 shows the number of star analysts in year 0, # star 
Yr+1 shows the number of star analyst who were among the top three (or the top one) in year 0 and remain among the top three (or the top one) in year +1. Retention 
shows the retention ratio. 
Panel A Top one analysts in each ranking 
 II magazine ranking  Alpha magazine ranking 
Year # star Yr 0 # star Yr+1 retention # star Yr +2 retention  # star Yr 0 # star Yr +1 retention # star Yr +2 retention 
2004 61 50 81.97% 33 54.10%  61 38 62.30% 34 55.74% 
2005 61 39 63.93% 34 55.74%  61 37 60.66% 31 50.82% 
2006 60 41 68.33% 31 51.67%  60 38 63.33% 28 46.67% 
2007 58 41 70.69% 34 58.62%  58 32 55.17%   
2008 56 39 69.64% 32 57.14%  56     
2009 56 40 71.43% 35 62.50%       
2010 56 40 71.43% 34 60.71%       
2011 57 41 71.93% 35 61.40%       
2012 56 44 78.57% 36 64.29%  55 39 70.91% 27 49.09% 
2013 54 41 75.93% 31 57.41%  54 34 62.96% 29 53.70% 
2014 52 39 75.00% 24 46.15%  53 26 49.06% 20 37.74% 
2015 49 32 65.31%    49 27 55.10%   





Table 2.1 Continued 
Panel B Top three analysts in each ranking 
 II magazine ranking  Alpha magazine ranking 
2004 181 139 76.80% 113 62.43%  177 130 73.45% 109 61.58% 
2005 178 133 74.72% 103 57.87%  179 124 69.27% 94 52.51% 
2006 174 124 71.26% 98 56.32%  168 109 64.88% 85 50.60% 
2007 170 117 68.82% 103 60.59%  166 97 58.43%   
2008 165 121 73.33% 111 67.27%  165     
2009 163 130 79.75% 111 68.10%       
2010 164 124 75.61% 112 68.29%       
2011 167 127 76.05% 114 68.26%       
2012 162 119 73.46% 100 61.73%  55 48 87.27% 39 70.91% 
2013 161 122 75.78% 103 63.98%  160 113 70.63% 97 60.63% 
2014 158 117 74.05%    153 110 71.90% 93 60.78% 
2015 148      149 105 70.47%   























Table 2.2 Description of All-America Research Team Ranking 
Panel A reports the number of star analysts (including 1st, 2nd, and 3rd places on the ranking) who only show up in the 
star ranking voted by hedge funds (No. HF star analysts), the number of star analysts who only show up in the ranking 
by institutional investors (No. II star analysts) and the number of star analysts on both hedge fund and institutional 
investors ranking (No. common star analysts). Panel B reports the total number of industries covered by the ranking 
in each year and the number of industries that have no common star analysts, one common star analyst, two common 
star analysts and three common star analysts in each year. 
 
Panel A number of analysts in each star category 
Year No. HF star analysts (%) No. II star analysts (%) No. Common star analysts (%) 
2004 43 (20%) 47 (20%) 134 (61%) 
2005 42 (19%) 41 (19%) 137 (62%) 
2006 32 (16%) 38 (18%)  136 (66%) 
2007 38 (19%) 42 (19%) 128 (63%)  
2008 42 (21%) 42 (20%) 123 (59%)  
2013 43 (21%) 44 (21%) 117 (58%) 
2014 31 (19%) 36 (19%) 122 (65%)  
2015 36 (19%) 35 (19%) 113 (61%) 
 
Panel B number of industries with different numbers of common star analysts 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2013 2014 2015 
# common star analysts  # of industries 
0 12 14 12 14 10 12 12 11 
1 20 24 25 15 25 26 17 21 
2 19 12 15 22 15 12 16 9 
3 10 12 9 8 7 7 11 11 
















Table 2.3 Descriptive Statistics by Analyst Groups 
This table reports characteristics of an average analyst in each group in the earnings forecast sample. We take the top 
three research teams (i.e., 1st, 2nd and 3rd places) in each ranking as star analysts and examine four mutually exclusive 
groups of analysts in this paper: 1) star analysts who only show up in the best analyst ranking voted by hedge funds 
(HF star analysts); 2) star analysts who only show up in the best analyst ranking voted by institutional investors (II 
star analysts); 3) star analysts who show up in both best analyst rankings (common star analysts) and 4) non-star 
analysts who are the rest analysts in I/B/E/S database The sample requires at least four analysts covering the same 
stock each quarter. I compute each variable for each analyst each year, then take the average across all the analysts 
within each analyst group each year and report the time series average of the statistics over eight years. Column N 
reports the rounded average number of analysts in each analyst group each year in the sample. Analysts’ experience 
is the number of years the analyst exists in I/B/E/S database. Number of covered firms/industries is the number of 
firms/industries covered by each analyst in the 12 months before each April in the year star analyst ranking is released. 
Percentage of first forecasts over number of covered firms is the number of times an analyst gives the first earnings 
forecast scaled by the number of firms covered in a year. Number of forecasts revision per firm per year is the number 
of total earnings forecasts an average analyst makes during a year over the number of firms covered in a year. Accuracy 
score and boldness score (value between 0 and 100) are constructed as in Hong, Kubik and Solomon (2000) and 
measure the rank of forecast accuracy and boldness among all the analysts that cover the same stock36 in the same 
quarter. Higher value of accuracy (boldness) score indicates better accuracy (bolder forecast).  
 
Summary statistics for analysts’ earnings forecast in each category 
Analyst group N Mean Min Max St. Dev P25 P50 P75 
 Analysts’ experience (number of years) 
Common star analysts 130 16.94 2.13 27.50 7.42 10.75 17.50 24.00 
II-star analysts 40 16.35 2.13 27.38 8.41 8.81 17.88 24.25 
HF-star analysts 39 15.55 1.75 26.75 7.93 8.81 15.88 23.00 
Non-star analysts 3485 10.56 0.00 29.00 8.70 3.00 7.69 18.13 
 Number of covered stocks per year 
Common star analysts 130 16.53 3.13 51.13 7.25 11.75 15.94 19.63 
II-star analysts 40 14.64 2.88 40.63 7.73 9.38 13.63 18.81 
HF-star analysts 39 15.86 4.38 34.88 6.39 11.75 15.00 18.81 
Non-star analysts 3485 9.15 1.00 62.38 6.82 3.13 8.38 13.50 
 Number of industries covered per year 
Common star analysts 130 3.62 1.00 11.00 2.22 2.00 3.38 4.75 
II-star analysts 40 3.30 1.00 9.88 2.18 1.50 2.69 4.56 
HF-star analysts 39 3.55 1.00 9.38 2.09 2.00 3.25 4.81 
Non-star analysts 3485 2.80 1.00 21.63 2.31 1.00 2.00 3.75 
 
 Number of forecasts revision per firm per year 
Common star analysts 130 7.53 1.76 22.99 3.15 5.59 7.12 8.78 
II-star analysts 40 7.43 2.17 16.78 3.05 5.48 7.12 8.96 
HF-star analysts 39 7.68 2.65 18.61 3.25 5.76 7.16 8.91 
Non-star analysts 3485 5.03 1 43.39 3.23 2.67 4.72 6.57 




36 I follow Hong, Kubik and Solomon (2000) and Ke and Yu (2006) to create performance and boldness score. A 





Table 2.3 Continued 
Analyst group N Mean Min Max St. Dev P25 P50 P75 
 Percentage of first forecasts over number of covered firms (%) 
Common star analysts 130 7.69 0.00 50.83 9.14 1.44 4.95 10.54 
II-star analysts 40 7.07 0.00 35.59 8.83 0.05 4.21 10.54 
HF-star analysts 39 7.20 0.00 29.08 7.25 1.44 5.30 11.21 
Non-star analysts 3485 7.84 0.00 100 12.91 0.00 2.83 10.85 
 Accuracy score 
Common star analysts 130 50.95 25.61 73.71 7.12 47.11 51.18 55.35 
II-star analysts 40 51.25 36.87 66.09 6.57 47.03 51.24 55.68 
HF-star analysts 39 50.85 31.45 65.93 7.39 46.49 50.93 55.64 
Non-star analysts 3485 48.67 0.00 100.00 14.17 42.86 49.81 55.56 
 Boldness score 
Common star analysts 130 50.17 34.09 75.90 6.58 46.14 49.65 53.59 
II-star analysts 40 50.68 34.23 71.85 7.63 45.72 50.34 54.51 
HF-star analysts 39 50.68 37.99 65.95 6.36 46.26 50.04 54.48 































Table 2.4 Summary Statistics of Covered Firm Characteristics 
This table reports the time series average of mean value of firm characteristics in the first calendar quarter of each 
year. The sample includes stocks covered by analysts (i.e., firms receive quarterly earnings forecast) in the previous 
12 months before each April in years between 2004 and 2008 and 2013 and 2015. Column (1) includes stocks covered 
by common star analysts. Column (2) includes stocks covered by II star analysts. Column (3) includes stocks covered 
by HF star analysts. Column (4) includes stocks covered by non-star analysts. Star analysts include the 1st, 2nd and 3rd 
analysts on each ranking. The last column reports the difference between column (2) and (3) and t statistics are Newey-
West adjusted with four lags. T statistics are in the parentheses. Variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. 
Subsequent 12m cret is the cumulative stock return in the subsequent 12 months. Amihud illiquidity is constructed as 
in Acharya, Pedersen (2005). Idiosyncratic volatility is measured by standard deviation of the residual in Fama French 
3 factor regression with three month daily return data. Size is the natural log of market capitalization (in 000s). To 
compute volume, we first calculate the average daily trading volume over shares outstanding during the past six 
months, then sort the average daily turnover within the stock’s listed exchange into 100 percentiles and then convert 
the percentile into 0 and 1 by dividing by 99. Inst. ownership is percentage of equity owned by institutional investors. 
We construct sales growth rate (%), SUE (standardized unexpected earnings), dividend yield, BP ratio (book-to-price) 
and CAPEX/AT (capital expenditure over total assets) as in Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische and Lee (2004).  
 
Variable Common star II star HF star Non-star diff 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (2)-(3) 
Subsequent 12m cret 0.0398 0.0415 0.0396 0.0278 0.0018 
     (0.26) 
Amihud illiquidity 0.0016 0.0012 0.0011 0.0047 0.0000 
     (0.16) 
Idiosyncratic volatility 0.0158 0.0150 0.0156 0.0176 -0.0006** 
     (-3.34) 
Size 22.36 22.79 22.66 21.63 0.1218** 
     (2.52) 
Volume 0.6020 0.5741 0.5965 0.6025 -0.0225* 
     (2.04) 
Inst. ownership 0.7391 0.7252 0.7264 0.7139 -0.0013 
     (-0.21) 
Sales growth rate (%) 1.1192 1.1095 1.1282 1.1462 -0.0187** 
     (-3.49) 
SUE 0.1344 0.0943 0.1263 0.1120 -0.0321** 
     (-2.41) 
Dividend yield 0.0136 0.0150 0.0145 0.0112 0.0005 
     (0.39) 
BP ratio 0.4311 0.4237 0.4192 0.4340 0.0045 
     (0.47) 
CAPEX/AT 0.1172 0.1154 0.1219 0.1148 -0.0065 





Table 2.5 Star Analyst Category, Earnings Forecast Accuracy and Forecast Boldness 
Panel A reports the regression results using analyst-firm-quarter observations. The sample includes the forecasts made by analysts during the 12 months prior April 
each year before the release of star analyst ranking. Accuracy score (value between 0 and 100) measures an analyst’ earnings forecast accuracy among all the 
analysts covering the stock. Higher value of performance score indicates better accuracy. Boldness score (value between 0 and 100) measures an analyst’s forecast 
boldness among all the analysts covering the stock. The boldness score are based on the first forecast made by each analyst to a given stock for a given fiscal 
quarter. Analysts are ranked based on their forecasts deviations and assigned the boldness score based on the ranking. Higher boldness score indicates higher 
deviation from other analysts covering the same stock. HF star analyst is 1 when the analyst only appears on hedge funds voted best analyst ranking. II star analyst 
is 1 when the analyst only appears on institutional investors voted best analyst ranking, but not hedge funds voted best analyst rankings. Common star analyst is 1 
when the analyst show up on both hedge funds and institutional investors’ best analyst rankings. Non-star analysts are the rest analysts in the I/B/E/S database. No. 
analysts following is the number of analysts who cover the stock in a quarter. First forecast dummy is 1 if the analyst is the first analyst that forecasts the earning 
for the given stock in a given quarter. Analyst experience is the number of years the analyst has been in the IBES database by the quarter. No. firms covered is the 
number of firms covered by the analyst. Top brokerage dummy is 1 when the brokerage firm has more than 20 analysts in a year. Firm characteristics include: size, 
subsequent 12 month stock return, institutional ownership, Amihud illiquidity, idiosyncratic volatility, trading volume, sales growth, capital expenditure, and 
dividend yield. Firm characteristics are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. Panel B reports multinomial logistic regression results using analyst-year observations. 
The dependent variable analyst group has four values, which represent HF star analyst, II star analyst, common star analyst and non-star analysts. The base level 
is II star analysts and the reported coefficients are relative risk ratio minus one. Percentage of first forecasts is the number of first earnings forecast over the number 
of firms covered by an analyst in a year. No. forecasts is the number of earnings forecasts an analyst made over a year. Accuracy score is the average of four 






















Table 2.5 Continued 
Panel A Analyst firm quarterly level regression 

















HF star analyst 1.074*** 1.145*** 1.165*** 0.794* 0.792** 0.205 -0.004 -0.158* 
 (3.18) (3.20) (3.38) (2.01) (1.97) (0.51) (-0.97) (-1.84) 
II star analyst 1.408*** 1.536*** 1.100** 0.819** 0.838** -0.149 -0.013*** -0.183** 
 (3.36) (3.45) (2.46) (2.05) (2.03) (-0.38) (-2.97) (-2.32) 
Common star analyst 1.232*** 1.349*** 1.147*** 0.031 0.041 -0.528* -0.005 -0.186*** 
 (5.00) (5.19) (4.03) (0.12) (0.16) (-1.94) (-1.45) (-3.49) 
No. analysts following -0.002 0.037*** -0.008** 0.006*** 0.041*** 0.011*** -0.004*** -0.063*** 
 (-1.30) (15.91) (-2.49) (3.24) (14.43) (3.13) (-20.04) (-42.89) 
First forecast dummy  -0.967*** -1.190*** -0.802*** 2.041*** 1.986*** 2.152***   
 (-3.95) (-4.39) (-3.38) (5.99) (5.73) (6.32)   
Analyst experience -0.036*** -0.039*** -0.043*** -0.016** -0.016** 0.003 0.003** 0.004*** 
 (-5.97) (-5.87) (-7.48) (-2.06) (-2.03) (0.36) (2.52) (3.32) 
No. firms covered 0.042*** 0.046*** 0.033** -0.012 -0.016 0.003 0.002*** 0.013*** 
 (3.39) (3.62) (2.47) (-1.18) (-1.61) (0.29) (9.32) (8.85) 
Top brokerage dummy 0.640*** 0.767***  -0.647*** -0.615***   0.500*** 
 (3.25) (3.66)  (-4.27) (-3.94)   (13.14) 
         
Firm characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Quarter fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y    
Broker fixed effects   Y   Y   
Analyst-Broker fixed 
effects 
      Y  
No. observations 379680 379680 379665 379680 379680 379665 379266 379680 
Test H0: coefficient [HF star analyst] = coefficient [II star analyst] 





Table 2.5 Continued 
Panel B Multinomial logistic regression (Base group = II star analysts) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Common star vs. II star HF star vs. II star Non-star vs. II star 
Accuracy score -0.003 -0.006 -0.015*** 
 (0.490) (0.360) (0.000) 
Boldness score -0.004 0.001 -0.009* 
 (0.394) (0.926) (0.064) 
No. forecasts 0.002** 0.002** -0.008*** 
 (0.019) (0.032) (0.000) 
Analyst experience 0.006 -0.014 -0.058*** 
 (0.557) (0.223) (0.000) 
Top brokerage dummy -0.319 -1.058* -3.189*** 
 (0.468) (0.051) (0.000) 
Percentage of first forecasts 0.509 0.044 2.151** 
 (0.589) (0.967) (0.011) 
    
Year Fixed Effects Y 
No. observations 28995 
Pseudo R-squared 0.150 



























Table 2.6 Star Analyst Category and Stock Recommendation 
This table reports the regression results where dependent variables are analyst-firm level recommendation. The sample 
includes the recommendation made by analysts during the 12 months prior the end of June in year t (analysts star 
ranking is released in October year t). Other than the revising analyst, there are at least another analysts made 
recommendations for the same stock. HF star analyst is 1 when the analyst only appears on hedge funds voted best 
analyst ranking. Common star analyst is 1 when the analyst is on both HF and II voted best analysts. Leader analyst 
dummy is constructed based on Cooper, Day, and Lewis (2001). Top broker dummy is one if the broker is among the 
top 20 largest brokers in a year, based on the number of its affiliated analysts. Size is log of market capitalization. EP 
is earnings-to-price ratio, Standard errors are clustered at firm level for order logit model and at firm and quarter for 
OLS model. P-values are in the parentheses. 
 
 Ordered logit OLS Ordered logit OLS 
 Rec Rec Rec Rec 
HF star analyst -0.137** -0.090 -0.160** -0.084 
 (0.021) (0.100) (0.045) (0.287) 
II star analyst 0.104 0.074 0.072 0.083 
 (0.206) (0.233) (0.460) (0.334) 
Common Star analyst -0.080** -0.044* -0.113** -0.032 
 (0.039) (0.067) (0.028) (0.282) 
Leader Analyst dummy -0.020 0.003 0.107* 0.065 
 (0.618) (0.884) (0.051) (0.101) 
Top broker dummy -0.282*** -0.154*** -0.402*** -0.208*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size   0.067*** 0.231*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Subsequent cumulative 12month ret   0.091* 0.023 
   (0.079) (0.506) 
EP   0.195* -0.077 
   (0.068) (0.317) 
Idiosyncratic volatility   -3.714** -2.747 
   (0.039) (0.159) 
Illiquidity   2.098*** 0.929*** 
   (0.001) (0.006) 
Dividend yield   -3.480** 0.321 
   (0.028) (0.123) 
External financing   0.548*** 0.142* 
   (0.000) (0.052) 
Quarter fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm Fixed effects  Y  Y 
No. observations 44237 43534 22173 21832 
Test H0: coefficient [II star analyst] = coefficient [HF star analyst] 
 Prob. > chi2 Prob. > F Prob. > chi2 Prob. > F 





Table 2.7 Star Analyst Category and Stock Performance Following the Recommendations 
This table reports the regression results where dependent variables are buy and hold abnormal return by trading days subsequent to the recommendation 
announcement. For example, [0, 1] is the cumulative abnormal return from announcement date to the subsequent one trading day. Value weighted CRSP index is 
used as the benchmark for buy and hold abnormal return. ∆rec is the signed revision of recommendation by an analyst for a given stock (all recommendations 
included in the sample are active recommendations, and recommendations are considered active within 180 days). Standard errors are clustered at firm and quarter 
level. 
 Buy and hold abnormal return by trading days after recommendation (full sample) 
 [0] [0, 1] [0, 2] [0, 21] [0, 42] [0, 63] [0, 84] [0, 105] [0, 126] 
∆rec 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (21.99) (22.32) (23.24) (22.44) (18.73) (23.07) (16.73) (14.52) (15.62) 
HF star analyst 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.86) (0.56) (0.36) (0.50) (-0.42) (0.14) (0.08) (-0.41) (-0.54) 
II star analyst -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.012 0.009 0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.68) (0.31) (0.23) (0.36) (0.11) (1.23) (0.92) (0.06) (-0.09) 
Common star analyst -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.012* -0.006 -0.008 -0.010 -0.006 -0.011 
 (-0.70) (-1.28) (-1.28) (-2.13) (-1.34) (-1.41) (-1.44) (-0.85) (-1.03) 
Leader analyst -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.003 
 (-0.68) (-0.93) (-1.09) (-0.95) (-1.85) (-1.04) (-0.68) (-0.17) (0.31) 
HF star analyst × ∆rec 0.004 0.008** 0.007* 0.012** 0.014* 0.009 0.013* 0.013** 0.012** 
 (1.78) (2.46) (1.99) (3.01) (2.15) (1.35) (1.99) (2.38) (2.81) 
II star analyst × ∆rec -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.003 -0.007 -0.003 -0.004 
 (-0.90) (-0.13) (-0.04) (-0.05) (-0.37) (-0.56) (-1.04) (-0.47) (-0.73) 
Common star analyst × ∆rec 0.001 0.003* 0.004* 0.005* 0.005* 0.005 0.007* 0.009** 0.009* 
 (1.27) (2.27) (2.13) (2.01) (1.94) (1.83) (2.16) (2.81) (1.99) 
Leader analyst × ∆rec 0.002 0.004 0.003* 0.002 0.004 0.008** 0.009** 0.010** 0.011** 
 (1.65) (1.80) (1.94) (1.31) (1.58) (2.88) (2.67) (2.88) (2.40) 
Quarter fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Broker fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
No. observations 44190 44191 44187 44112 43896 43637 43350 43088 42831 
Test H0: coefficient [II star analyst × ∆rec] = coefficient [HF star analyst × ∆rec] 





Table 2.8 Star Analysts’ Recommendation Deviation and Market Reaction 
This table reports the regression where buy and hold abnormal returns by different trading days are dependent variables. For example, [0, 1] is the cumulative 
abnormal return from announcement date to the subsequent one trading day. Value weighted CRSP index is used as the benchmark for buy and hold abnormal 
return. Deviation is the signed difference between analyst i’s recommendation and the consensus recommendation the day before analyst i announcement the 
recommendation. The consensus recommendation includes recommendations made by other analysts that are active (the most recent recommendation within the 
prior 180 calendar days). Standard errors are clustered at firm and quarter level. 
 Buy and hold abnormal return by trading days after recommendation (full sample) 
 [0] [0, 1] [0, 2] [0, 21] [0, 42] [0, 63] [0, 84] [0, 105] [0, 126] 
∆Rec 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (24.98) (29.72) (29.30) (21.69) (13.89) (11.21) (7.48) (5.77) (5.95) 
Deviation 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.010** 0.010* 0.010* 
 (6.70) (6.49) (6.56) (6.16) (5.66) (3.78) (2.84) (2.32) (2.26) 
HF star analyst 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.006 -0.006 
 (1.40) (1.40) (1.07) (0.89) (0.03) (-0.06) (-0.14) (-0.71) (-0.72) 
II star analyst -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.011 0.007 -0.000 -0.002 
 (-0.92) (0.22) (0.17) (0.29) (-0.00) (1.21) (0.78) (-0.04) (-0.22) 
Common star analyst -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.012* -0.005 -0.007 -0.009 -0.005 -0.009 
 (-0.75) (-1.15) (-1.12) (-2.05) (-1.09) (-1.28) (-1.33) (-0.61) (-0.85) 
HF star analyst × Deviation 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.006 -0.008 -0.012 -0.010 
 (1.80) (1.82) (1.40) (1.55) (1.36) (-1.36) (-1.15) (-1.16) (-0.94) 
II star analyst × Deviation -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.009 -0.014* -0.011 -0.015 
 (-0.25) (-0.11) (0.40) (0.29) (-0.32) (-1.19) (-1.99) (-1.57) (-1.43) 
Common star analyst × Deviation -0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.009 0.011 
 (-0.14) (1.05) (1.78) (0.74) (1.26) (0.91) (0.85) (1.66) (1.86) 
Leader analyst dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Leader analyst dummy × Deviation Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Quarter Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Broker Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
No. observations 44190 44191 44187 44112 43896 43637 43350 43088 42831 
Test H0: coefficient [II star analyst × Deviation] = coefficient [HF star analyst × Deviation] 





Table 2.9 Firm Control Variable Definition 
Variable Definition 
Dividend yield  Calculated as the dividend payment of the prior year, divided by the 
market value of common equity at the end of the prior fiscal year. 
 
  





EP is the rolling sum of EPS for preceding four quarters, deflated by 
price at the end of quarter T 
  
External financing The amount of external financing scaled by the average total assets 
=
(𝑆𝑆𝑇𝐾 − 𝑃𝑅𝑆𝑇𝐾𝐶 − 𝐷𝑉 + 𝐷𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑆 − 𝐷𝐿𝑇𝐸 + ∆𝐷𝐿𝐶)




Idiosyncratic volatility  Measured by standard deviation of the residual in Fama French 3 
factor regression with three month daily return data 
 
  
Amihud liquidity (Illiq) Calculated with the following formula using data over the twelve 









𝑟𝑖𝑡 is daily returns and 𝐷𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 is daily dollar trading volume (price 
x volume) for stock i on day t. 𝐷𝑖 is the number of days with 
available ratio over the twelve months measurement window 
 
  







which is the rolling sum of sales for preceding four quarters over the 
rolling sum of sales for second preceding set of four quarters and T 
is the most recent quarter for which an earnings announcement was 









the nominator is the unexpected earnings for quarter T, with EPS 
defined as earnings per share (diluted) excluding extraordinary 
items, adjusted for stock distributions and the denominator is the 
standard deviation of unexpected earnings over eight preceding 







Table 2.9 Continued 
Variable Definition 
Institutional ownership  The quarterly shares owned by institutional investors over the total 
shares outstanding. Observations with greater than 100% aggregate 
institutional ownership are coded missing. 
 
  
Volume First calculate the average (daily trading volume over shares 
outstanding) during the past six months prior to the end of quarter q, 
then sort the average daily turnover within the stocks’ listed 
exchange (NYSE,AMEX or NASDAQ) into 100 percentiles (i.e., 0 
to 99) and then converted the percentile into 0 and 1 by dividing by 











































In this dissertation, I examine a group of important capital market participants, sell side equity 
analysts. The first chapter investigates the question: what information do sell side analysts use in their 
decision process? Specifically, we examine whether sell side analysts are savvy about a group of variables 
that have been shown to predict future stock returns by academic research. We do not find evidence that 
sell side analysts in aggregate incorporate such information in their stock recommendation and target price 
estimates. In the cross section of analyst population, we show that analysts from certain brokerage firms 
persistently estimate target price in the opposite direction as what return predicting variables from academic 
research suggests. These results suggest that trading based on investment advice from these brokerage firms 
could hurt the investment value. We also do not find evidence that “All-star” analysts process this 
information. However, evidence suggest that analysts’ experience are associated with being anomaly savvy. 
The second chapter of the dissertation examines the cross sectional differences among “All-star” analysts. 
Prior studies treat “All-star” analysts as a homogenous group. Motivated by the finding that there are 
substantial differences among institutional investors, we hypothesize that different types of institutional 
investors could value different qualities from sell side analysts. Since “All-star” analysts are voted by 
institutional investors, institutional investor’s preference with respect to analyst attributes is contained in 
the “All-star” analyst ranking. By comparing the best analysts voted by hedge funds and institutional 
investors, respectively, we show evidence consistent with the inference that different types of institutional 
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